1	The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty Derek L. Gaubatz, Esq.* (C.B.N. 208405)	
2	Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., Esq.	
3	Jared N. Leland, Esq. 1350 Connecticut Avenue NW	
4	Suite 605	
	Washington, DC 20036-1735 Telephone: (202) 955-0095	
5	Facsimile: (202) 955-0090	
6	Counsel for Defendant-Intervenors	
7	* Counsel of Record	
8	IN THE UNITED STAT	TO DISTRICT CALIBY
9	FOR THE EASTERN DIS	
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11)
	THE REV. DR. MICHAEL A. NEWDOW, et al.)
12	Plaintiffs,)
13	,) 2:05-cv-00017-LKK-DAD
14	V.) 2:03-CV-00017-LKK-DAD
15	THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES	,
16	OF AMERICA, et al.)
17	Defendants;)
18	and .)
	JOHN CAREY, et al.)
19	Defendant-Intervenors.)
20		_)
21	ANSWER OF DEFENDANT-INT	ERVENORS JOHN CAREY, et al.
22	TO FIRST AMENI	DED COMPLAINT
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1	For their Answer to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint ("Complaint") filed on April 11, 2005
2	in the case before the Court, Brenden Carey, Brenden Magnino, Adam Araiza, Michaela Bishop, Teresa
3	Declines, Darien Declines, Ryanna Declines, Anthony Doerr, Sean Forschler, Tiffany Forschler, and
4	Mary McKay ("Student-Intervenors"), and John and Adrienne Carey, Dave and Lynette Magnino,
5	Albert and Anita Araiza, Craig and Marie Bishop, Rommel and Janice Declines, Dan and Karen Doerr,
6	Fred and Esterlita Forschler, and Robert and Sharon McKay ("Parent-Intervenors"), and the Knights of
7	Columbus ("Knight-Intervenors"), deny any allegations in the First Amended Complaint not specifically
8	admitted herein, and state the following (collectively as "Defendant-Intervenors" or "Intervenors"):
9	FIRST DEFENSE
10	Answering specifically the allegations contained in the numbered paragraphs of Plaintiffs'
11	First Amended Complaint:
12	1. Intervenors state that paragraph 1 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law to
13	which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the
14	allegations in paragraph 1 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
15	thereof.
16	2. Intervenors state that paragraph 2 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law to
17	which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the
18	allegations in paragraph 2 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
19	thereof.
20	3. Intervenors state that paragraph 3 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law to
21	which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the
22	allegations in paragraph 3 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
23	thereof.
24	4. Intervenors state that paragraph 4 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law to
25	which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the
26	allegations in paragraph 4 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
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Answer of Defendant-Intervenors John Carey, et al. to First Amended Complaint

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1 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.

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- 2 14. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 14 for lack of knowledge or information 3 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 15. Intervenors state that paragraph 15 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed required, Intervenors admit that Congress is a branch of government of the United States of America and that some of Congress' legislative powers are granted by Article I, Section 1 of the United States Constitution.
- 16. Intervenors state that paragraph 16 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed required, Intervenors admit that Peter LeFevre is the Law Revision Counsel and, as such, is responsible, at least in part, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 285b, for the preparation and publication of the United States Code; and deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 16.
 - 17. Intervenors state that paragraph 17 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed required, Intervenors admit that United States of America is the constitutionally established government of the United States of America.
 - Intervenors state that paragraph 18 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed required, Intervenors admit that Arnold Schwarzenegger is the Governor of the state of California; and deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 18 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
 - 19. Intervenors state that paragraph 19 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed required, Intervenors admit that Richard J. Riordan is the Secretary of Education of the state of California; and deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 19 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
 - 20. Intervenors state that paragraph 20 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed required, Intervenors admit that the Elk Grove Unified School District is oversees public schools in Elk Grove, California; and deny the remaining

1	allegations in paragraph 20 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
2	truth thereof

- 21. Intervenors state that paragraph 21 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed required, Intervenors admit that Dr. Steven Ladd is Superintendent of Schools for the Elk Grove Unified School District; and, deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 21 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 22. Intervenors state that paragraph 22 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed required, Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 22 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 23. Intervenors state that paragraph 23 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed required, Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 23 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof
- 24. Intervenors state that paragraph 24 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed required, Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 24 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof
- 25. Intervenors state that paragraph 25 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed required, Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 25 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof
- 26. Intervenors state that paragraph 26 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed required, Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 26 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof
- 27. Intervenors state that paragraph 27 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed required, Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 27 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof
- 26 28.4 Intervenors state that paragraph 28 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law

- to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 2 the allegations in paragraph 28.
- 3 29.1 Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 29 for lack of knowledge or information
- 4 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 5 30. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 30 for lack of knowledge or information
- 6 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 7 31. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 31 for lack of knowledge or information
- 8 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 9 32. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 32 for lack of knowledge or information
- sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 11 33. Intervenors state that paragraph 33 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 12 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- that Plaintiffs' citation in paragraph 33, Pub. L. No. 622, 56 Stat. 380, is accurate, and therefore
- 14 Intervenors deny, in entirety, the allegations in paragraph 33.
- 15 34. Intervenors state that paragraph 34 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 16 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- that Plaintiffs' citation in paragraph 34, Section (7) of Pub. L. No. 622, 56 Stat. 380, is accurate, and
- therefore Intervenors deny, in entirety, the allegations in paragraph 34.
- 19 35. Intervenors state that paragraph 35 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 20 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. To the extent that an Answer is deemed required,
- 21 Intervenors state that Plaintiffs' use of the term "religious" is undefined and vague and Intervenors
- 22 therefore lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations using that term
- 23 in paragraph 35.
- 24 36. Intervenors admit that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution states, in
- 25 part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
- 26 exercise thereof "

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1	37. Intervenors state that paragraph 37 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
2	to which Intervenors are not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed to be required,
3	Intervenors admit that Congress passed an Act on June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 396, 68 Stat. 249, that
4	amended the Pledge to include the phrase "under God," and that 4 U.S.C. § 4 codifies the Pledge to read
5	as follows: "I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for
6	which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all"; and deny the
7	remaining allegations of paragraph 37.

- 8 Intervenors state that paragraph 38 contains descriptive material to which Intervenors are 38. 9 not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 38 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof. 10
 - 39. Intervenors state that paragraph 39 contains descriptive material to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 39 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.

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- Intervenors admit that the Pledge was amended in 1954 to include the phrase "under 14 40. 15 God" and deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 40.
- 16 Intervenors state that paragraph 41 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed to be required, 17 18 Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 41.
- 19 Intervenors state that paragraph 42 contains descriptive material to which Intervenors are 20 not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the 21 allegations in paragraph 42.
- 22 Intervenors state that paragraph 43 contains descriptive material to which Intervenors are 43. 23 not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in 24 paragraph 43.
- 25 Intervenors state that paragraph 44 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law 26 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny

1	the allegations in paragraph 44.
2	45. Intervenors state that paragraph 45 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
3	to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
4	the allegations in paragraph 45.
5	46. Intervenors admit that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution states, in
6	part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
7	exercise thereof"
8	47. Intervenors state that paragraph 47 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are
9	not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors admit that the Fifth
0	Amendment of the United States Constitution states, in part, that "No person shall be deprived or
1	life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
2	48. Intervenors state that paragraph 48 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are
13	not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors admit that the Religious
4	Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq., states, in part, the following:
15	§ 2000bb(a)(3): "The Congress finds that governments should not substantially
6	burden religious exercise without compelling justification."
17	
8	§ 2000bb(b)(1) and (b)(2): "The purposes of this chapter are to restore the compelling
19	interest test and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of
20	religion is substantially burdened; and to provide a claim or defense to persons whose
21	religious exercise is substantially burdened by government."
22	
23	§ 2000bb-1(b)(1) and (b)(2): "Government may substantially burden a person's
24	exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person
25	is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive
26	means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."
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7 2	Answer of Defendant-Intervenors John Carey, et al. to First Amended Complaint

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2	•	§ 2000bb-2(4): "[T]he term "exercise of religion" means religious exercise, as
3		defined in section 2000cc-5 of this title." [§ 2000cc-5(7)(A) "The term 'religious
4		exercise' includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central
5		to, a system of religious belief."]
6		
7		§ 2000bb-3(a): "This chapter applies to all Federal law, and the implementation of
8	·	that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after
9		November 16, 1993."
10		
11		§ 2000bb-3(c): "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize any
12		government to burden any religious belief."
13		
14	49.	Intervenors state that paragraph 49 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors
15	are not require	ed to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors admit that the
16	Fourteenth A	mendment of the United States Constitution states, in part, that "No State shall make or
17	enforce any la	www.ich shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; no
18	shall any State	e deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
19	to any person	within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
20	50.	Intervenors state that paragraph 50 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors
21	are not require	ed to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors admit that the states are
22	subject to the	First Amendment by and through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
23	Amendmer t.	
24	51.	Intervenors state that paragraph 51 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors
25	are not requir	ed to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors admit that Article I,
26	Section 4 of t	he California State Constitution states, in part, that "Free exercise and enjoyment of
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28	<u> </u>	9 Answer of Defendant-Intervenors John Carey, et al. to First Amended Complaint

i	religion without discrimination of preference are guaranteed The Degistature shart make no lav				
2	respecting an establishment of religion."				
3	52. Intervenors state that paragraph 52 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors				
4	are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors admit that Article I,				
5	Section 7 of the California State Constitution states, in part, that "A person may not be deprived of				
6	life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws."				
7	53. Intervenors state that paragraph 53 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors				
8	are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors admit that Article IX,				
9	Section 8 of the California State Constitution states, in part, that "No sectarian or denominational				
10	doctrine [shall] be taught, or instruction be permitted, directly or indirectly, in any of the common				
11	schools of his State."				
12	54. Intervenors state that paragraph 54 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors				
13	are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors admit that Section				
14	52720 of the California State Education Code states the following:				
15	In every public elementary school each day during the school year at the beginning o				
16	the first regularly scheduled class or activity period at which the majority of the				
17	pupils of the school normally begin the schoolday, there shall be conducted				
18	appropriate patriotic exercises. The giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of				
19	the United States of America shall satisfy the requirements of this section.				
20					
21	In every public secondary school there shall be conducted daily appropriate patriotic				
22	exercises. The giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of				
23	America shall satisfy such requirement. Such patriotic exercises for secondary				
24	schools shall be conducted in accordance with the regulations which shall be adopted				
25	by the governing board of the district maintaining the secondary school.				
26					
27	10				
28	Answer of Defendant-Intervenors John Carey, et al. to First Amended Complaint				

- 1 55.° Intervenors state that paragraph 55 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny 3 the allegations in paragraph 55 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 4 truth thereof.
- 5 Intervenors state that paragraph 56 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are 56. 6 not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors admit that none of 7 the plaintiffs have been compelled to say the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance and deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 56.
- 9 57. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 57 for lack of knowledge or information 10 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 11 58. Intervenors state that paragraph 58 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are 12 not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the 13 allegations in paragraph 58 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 14 truth thereof.
- 15 59. Intervenors state that paragraph 59 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are 16 not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the 17 allegations in paragraph 59 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 18 truth thereof.
- 19 60. Intervenors state that paragraph 60 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law 20 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. To the extent an answer is deemed to be required, 21 Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 60 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form 22 a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 23 Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 61 for lack of knowledge or information 61. 24 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 25 Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 62 for lack of knowledge or information 62. 26 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.

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- 1 63. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 63 for lack of knowledge or information
- 2 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 3 64. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 64 for lack of knowledge or information
- 4 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 5 65. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 65 for lack of knowledge or information
- 6 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 7 66. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 66 for lack of knowledge or information
- 8 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 9 67. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 67 for lack of knowledge or information
- sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 11 68. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 68 for lack of knowledge or information
- sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 13 69. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 69 for lack of knowledge or information
- sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 15 70. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 70 for lack of knowledge or information
- sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 17 71. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 71 for lack of knowledge or information
- 18 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 19 72. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 72 for lack of knowledge or information
- sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 21 73. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 73 for lack of knowledge or information
- sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 23 74. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 74 for lack of knowledge or information
- sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 25 75. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 75 for lack of knowledge or information
- sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.

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- 1 76. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 76 for lack of knowledge or information
- 2 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 3 77. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 77 for lack of knowledge or information
- 4 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 5 78. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 78 for lack of knowledge or information
- 6 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 7 79. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 79 for lack of knowledge or information
- 8 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 9 80. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 80 for lack of knowledge or information
- sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 11 81. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 81 for lack of knowledge or information
- sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 13 82. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 82 for lack of knowledge or information
- sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 15 83. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 83 for lack of knowledge or information
- sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 17 84. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 84 for lack of knowledge or information
- 18 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 19 85. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 85 for lack of knowledge or information
- sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 21 86. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 86 for lack of knowledge or information
- sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 23 87. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 87 for lack of knowledge or information
- sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 25 88. Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 88 for lack of knowledge or information
- sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.

1	89.	Intervenors state that paragraph 89 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
2	to which Inter	venors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
3	the allegations	s in paragraph 89 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
4	truth thereof.	

- 5 90. Intervenors state that paragraph 90 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law 6 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny 7 the allegations in paragraph 90 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 8 truth thereof.
- 9 91. Intervenors state that paragraph 91 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny 10 11 the allegations in paragraph 91 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 12 truth thereof.
- 13 92.1 Intervenors state that paragraph 92 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law 14 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny 15 the allegations in paragraph 92 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 16 truth thereof.
 - 93. Intervenors state that paragraph 93 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 93 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
 - 94. Intervenors state that paragraph 94 contains descriptive material to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 94 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
 - Intervenors state that paragraph 95 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law 95. to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 95 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the

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- 2 96. Intervenors state that paragraph 96 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 3 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 4 the allegations in paragraph 96 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 5 truth thereof.
- 6 97. Intervenors state that paragraph 97 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 7 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 8 the allegations in paragraph 97 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
 - truth thereof.
- 10 98. Intervenors state that paragraph 98 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 11 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 12 the allegations in paragraph 98 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 13 truth thereof.
- 14 99. Intervenors state that paragraph 99 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 15 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- the allegations in paragraph 99 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 17 truth thereof.
- 18 100. Intervenors state that paragraph 100 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 20 the allegations in paragraph 100 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 21 truth thereof.
- 22 101. Intervenors state that paragraph 101 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 23 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- the allegations in paragraph 101 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 25 truth thereof.
- 26 102. Intervenors state that paragraph 102 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law

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1	to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, intervenors deny				
2	the allegations in paragraph 102 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the				
3	truth thereof.				
4	103. Intervenors state that paragraph 103 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law				
5	to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny				
6	the allegations in paragraph 103 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the				
7	truth thereof.				
8	104. Intervenors state that paragraph 104 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law				
9	to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny				
10	the allegations in paragraph 104 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the				
11	truth thereof.				
12	105. Intervenors state that paragraph 105 contains descriptive material to which Intervenors				
13	are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in				
14	paragraph 105 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.				
15	106. Intervenors state that paragraph 106 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are				
16	not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in				
17	paragraph 106 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.				
18	107. Intervenors state that paragraph 107 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are				
19	not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in				
20	paragraph 107 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.				
21	108. Intervenors state that paragraph 108 contains descriptive material to which Intervenors				
22	are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in				
23	paragraph 08 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof				
24	109. Intervenors state that paragraph 109 contains descriptive material to which Intervenors				

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are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in

paragraph 109 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.

1	110.	Intervenors state that paragraph 110 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
2	to which Inter	venors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
3	the allegations	s in paragraph 110 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
4	truth thereof.	
5	111.	Intervenors state that paragraph 111 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
6	to which Inter	venors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
7	the allegations	s in paragraph 111 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
8	truth thereof.	
9	112.	Intervenors state that paragraph 112 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
0	to which Inter	venors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
1	the allegations	s in paragraph 112 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
12	truth thereof.	
3	113.	Intervenors state that paragraph 113 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
4	to which Inter	venors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
5	the allegations	s in paragraph 113 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
6	truth thereof.	
17	114.	Intervenors state that paragraph 114 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
8	to which Inter	venors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
9	the allegations	s in paragraph 114 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
20	truth thereof.	
21	115.	Intervenors state that paragraph 115 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
22	to which Inter	venors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
23	the allegations	s in paragraph 115 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
24	truth thereof.	
25	116.	Intervenors state that paragraph 116 contains descriptive material to which Intervenors

are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in

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1 paragraph 116 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.

2 117. Intervenors state that paragraph 117 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law

3 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny

the allegations in paragraph 117 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the

5 truth thereof.

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6 118. Intervenors state that paragraph 118 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law

7 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny

the allegations in paragraph 118 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the

truth thereof.

10 119. Intervenors state that paragraph 119 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law

to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny

the allegations in paragraph 119 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the

13 truth thereof.

14 120. Intervenors state that paragraph 120 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law

15 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny

the allegations in paragraph 120 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the

17 truth thereof.

18 121. Intervenors state that paragraph 121 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law

to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny

the allegations in paragraph 121 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the

21 truth thereof.

22 122. Intervenors state that paragraph 122 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law

to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny

the allegations in paragraph 122 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the

25 truth thereof.

123. Intervenors state that paragraph 123 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law

27 28

- 1 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 2 the allegations in paragraph 123 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 3 truth thereof.
- 4 124. Intervenors state that paragraph 124 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 5 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 6 the allegations in paragraph 124.
- 7 125. Intervenors state that paragraph 125 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 8 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 9 the allegations in paragraph 125.
- 10 126. Intervenors admit that Article XVI, Section 5 of the California State Constitution states,
- in part, that "... the Legislature ... shall [never] make an appropriation, or pay from any public fund
- 12 whatever, or grant anything to or in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian purpose, ...
- 13 nor shall any grant or donation of personal property or real estate ever be made by the State . . . for any
- 14 religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose whatever."
- 15 127. Intervenors state that paragraph 127 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- the allegations in paragraph 127.
- 18 128. Intervenors state that paragraph 128 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 19 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 20 the allegations in paragraph 128.
- 21 129. Intervenors state that paragraph 129 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 22 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 23 the allegations in paragraph 129.
- 24 130. Intervenors state that paragraph 130 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 25 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- the allegations in paragraph 130.

- 1 131. Intervenors state that paragraph 131 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 2 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 3 the allegations in paragraph 131.
- 4 132. Intervenors state that paragraph 132 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 5 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 6 the allegations in paragraph 132.
- 7 133. Intervenors state that paragraph 133 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 8 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 9 the allegations in paragraph 133.
- 10 134. Intervenors state that paragraph 134 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 11 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- the allegations in paragraph 134 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 13 truth thereof.
- 14 135. Intervenors state that paragraph 135 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 15 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 16 the allegations in paragraph 135 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 17 truth thereof.
- 18 136. Intervenors state that paragraph 136 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 19 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 20 the allegations in paragraph 136.
- 21 137. Intervenors state that paragraph 137 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 22 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 23 the allegations in paragraph 137 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 24 truth thereof.
- 25 138. Intervenors state that paragraph 138 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny

- 1 the allegations in paragraph 138 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 2 truth thereof.
- 3 139. Intervenors state that paragraph 139 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are
- 4 not required to plead.
- 5 140. Intervenors state that paragraph 140 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 6 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 7 the allegations in paragraph 140.
- 8 141. Intervenors state that paragraph 141 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 9 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 10 the allegations in paragraph 141 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 11 truth thereof.
- 12 142. Intervenors state that paragraph 142 contains descriptive material to which Intervenors
- 13 are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in
- paragraph 142 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 15 143. Intervenors state that paragraph 143 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 17 the allegations in paragraph 143 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 18 truth thereof.
- 19 144. Intervenors state that paragraph 144 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 21 the allegations in paragraph 144.
- 22 145. Intervenors state that paragraph 145 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 23 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 24 the allegations in paragraph 145 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 25 truth thereof.
- 26 146. Intervenors state that paragraph 146 contains descriptive material to which Intervenors

- are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in
- 2 paragraph 146 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 3 147. Intervenors state that paragraph 147 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 4 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 5 the allegations in paragraph 147.
- 6 148. Intervenors state that paragraph 148 contains descriptive material to which Intervenors
- 7 are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in
- 8 paragraph 48.
- 9 149. Intervenors state that paragraph 149 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 10 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 11 the allegations in paragraph 149.
- 12 150. Intervenors state that paragraph 150 contains descriptive material to which Intervenors
- 13 are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in
- 14 paragraph 50.
- 15 151. Intervenors state that paragraph 151 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 16 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- the allegations in paragraph 151.
- 18 152. Intervenors state that paragraph 152 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 19 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- the allegations in paragraph 152 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 21 truth thereof.
- 22 153. Intervenors state that paragraph 153 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 23 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- the allegations in paragraph 153 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 25 truth thereof.

26 154. Intervenors state that paragraph 154 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are

- 1 not require'd to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in
- 2 paragraph 54.
- 3 155. Intervenors state that paragraph 155 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 4 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 5 the allegations in paragraph 155 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 6 truth thereof.
- 7 156. Intervenors state that paragraph 156 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are
- 8 not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in
- 9 paragraph 56.
- 10 157. Intervenors state that paragraph 157 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 11 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 12 the allegations in paragraph 157.
- 13 158. Intervenors state that paragraph 158 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are
- 14 not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in
- 15 paragraph 58.
- 16 159. Intervenors state that paragraph 159 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are
- 17 not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in
- 18 paragraph 39.
- 19 160. Intervenors state that paragraph 160 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are
- 20 not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in
- 21 paragraph 60 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 22 161. Intervenors state that paragraph 161 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 23 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- the allegations in paragraph 161 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 25 truth thereof.
- 26 162. Intervenors state that paragraph 162 contains conclusions of law to which Intervenors are

1	not required to plead.	If an answer	is deemed	to be requ	uired, Intervenors	deny the	allegations	in
2	paragraph 162.							

- 163. Intervenors state that paragraph 163 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors admit that none of the plaintiffs have been compelled to say the Pledge, and deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 63 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- Intervenors state that paragraph 164 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 164 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 11 165. Intervenors state that paragraph 165 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 165 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
- 166. Intervenors state that paragraph 166 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in paragraph 166 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
 - 167. Intervenors state that paragraph 167 contains descriptive material to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in the second sentence of paragraph 167.
 - 168. Intervenors state that paragraph 168 contains descriptive material to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in the second sendence of paragraph 168.
 - 169. Intervenors state that paragraph 169 contains descriptive material to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny the allegations in the

1	second	sentence	of	paragraph	169.
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- 2 170. Intervenors state that paragraph 170 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 3 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 4 the allegations in paragraph 170.
- 5 171. Intervenors state that paragraph 171 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 6 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 7 the allegations in paragraph 171 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 8 truth thereof.
- 9 172. Intervenors state that paragraph 172 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 10 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- the allegations in paragraph 172 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 12 truth thereof.
- 13 173. Intervenors state that paragraph 173 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 14 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 15 the allegations in paragraph 173 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 16 truth thereof.
- 17 174. Intervenors state that paragraph 174 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 18 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 19 the allegations in paragraph 174 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
- 20 truth thereof.
- 21 175. Intervenors state that paragraph 175 contains descriptive material and conclusions of law
- 22 to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required, Intervenors deny
- 23 the allegations in paragraph 175.
- 24 176. Intervenors state that the WHEREFORE clause contains conclusions of law and requests
- 25 for relief to which Intervenors are not required to plead. If an answer is deemed to be required,
- 26 Intervenors' deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to any relief, including the declarations, sums, expenses,

1	damages, fees, costs, disbursements, and all other relief, equitable or otherwise, requested.				
2	SECOND DEFENSE				
3	177. Plaintiffs have or may have failed to state, in whole or in part, a claim upon which relief				
4	can be grarted, and so the First Amended Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of				
5	Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).				
6					
7		Respectfully submitted,			
8		The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty			
9		Derek L. Gaubatz, Esq.* (C.B.N. 208405)			
10	•	Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., Esq. Jared N. Leland, Esq.			
11	•	1350 Connecticut Avenue NW Suite 605			
12		Washington, DC 20036-1735			
13	<i>:</i>	Telephone: (202) 955-0095 Facsimile: (202) 955-0090			
14	Date: May 9, 2005	Counsel for Defendant-Intervenors			
15	, , 2000	*Counsel of Record			
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27		26			
28	Answer of Defendant-Intervenors John Carey, et al. to First Amended Complaint				

1 PORTER, SCOTT, WEIBERG & DELEHANT A Professional Corporation Terence J. Cassidy, SBN 099180 Michael W. Pott, SBN 186156 Kyra Johnson, SBN 232328 350 University Avenue, Suite 200 Sacramento, California 95825 (916) 929-1481 (916) 927-3706 (facsimile) 6 Attorneys for Defendants ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. STEVEN LADD. SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. M. MAGDALENA CARRILLO MEJIA, ELVERTA JOINT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. DIANNA MANGERICH. RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT and FRANK S. PORTER 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 THE REV. DR. MICHAEL A. NEWDOW IN Case No.: CIV 05-0017 LKK DAD PRO PER, JAN DOE AND PAT DOE. **DEFENDANTS' REQUEST** 13 PARENTS; DOECHILD, A MINOR CHILD; FOR JAN ROE; PARENT; ROECHILD-1 AND JUDICIAL NOTICE ROECHILD-2, MINOR CHILDREN, 15 Plaintiffs. 16 VS. 17 THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE UNITED STATES OF 18 AMERICA; THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA; THE ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT ("EGUSD"); DR. STEVEN LADD, SUPERINTENDENT, EGUSD: 20 SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT ("SCUSD"); DR. M. MAGDALENA 155 CARRILLO MEJIA, SUPERINTENDENT, 21 ELVERTA SCUSD; THE JULY 18, 2005 DATE: 22 ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT TIME: 10:00 a.m. ("EJESD"); DR. DIANNA MANGERICH. CTRM: 23 SUPERINTENDENT, EJESD; THE RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT 24 ("RLUSD"); FRANK S. PORTER. SUPERINTENDENT, RLUSD; 25 Defendants. 26 27 111 28 111 DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

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LAW OFFICES OF PORTER, SCOTT, 'EIBERG & DELEHANT ROFESSIONAL CORPORATION UNIVERSITY AVE, SUITE 20 FO. BOX 235428 ACRAMENTO, CA 95865

(916) 929-1481 ww.pswdlaw.com 25

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Attorneys for Defendants ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. STEVEN LADD, SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. M. MAGDALENA CARRILLO MEJIA, ELVERTA JOINT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. DIANNA MANGERICH, RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT and FRANK S. PORTER respectfully request that the Court take judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 201 and relevant case law of the following items:

- 1. The Original Complaint in Newdow v. Congress of the United States, et. al., CIV.S-00-0495 MLS PAN PS. A true and correct copy of the Original Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
- 2. The History-Social Science Academic Content Standards for California Public Schools, kindergarten through grade twelve adopted by the California State Board of Education which set out the knowledge, concepts and skills that students should acquire at each grade level regarding History-Social Sciences, specifically, the History-Social Science Content Standards §§ K.1, 3.4, 5.7, 8.3, 11.1, 11.3. A true and correct copy of the website home page and pertinent portions of the referenced sections are attached hereto at Exhibit B.

Under FRE 201, a court may properly take judicial notice of "records and reports of administrative bodies." Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Southern California Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380, 385 (1953). The content standards adopted by the California State Board of Education, as one such administrative body, are therefore among the documents that a court may properly take judicial notice of.

Dated: May 16, 2005

Respectfully submitted,

PORTER, SCOTT, WEIBERG & DELEHANT A Professional Corporation

By /s/ Terence J. Cassidy

Terence J. Cassidy
Attorney for Defendants
EGUSD, Dr. Steven Ladd, SCUSD, Dr. M.
Magdalena Carrillo Mejia, EJESD, Dr. Dianna
Mangerich, RLUSD and Frank S. Porter

Exhibit A

Omitted for Purposes of Appeal

EXHIBIT B TO REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

CASE NO. CIV 05-0017



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Home » SBE Home » Standards & Frameworks » Content Standards

Printer-frie

History-Social Science

Academic content standards for kindergarten through grade twelve, adopted by the California State Board of E

A Message from the State Board of Education and the State Superintendent of Public Instructions

Introduction

Kindergarten Through Grade Five

Historical and Social Sciences Analysis Skills
Kindergarten, Learning and Working Now and Long Ago
Grade One: A Child's Place in Time and Space
Grade Two, People Who Make Difference
Grade Three: Continuity and Change
Gorde Four, California, A Changing State
Grade Five: United States History and Geography, Making a New Nation

Grades Six Through Eight

Historical and Social Sciences Analysis Skills
Grade Six: World History and Geography: Ancient Civilizations
Grade Seven: World History and Geography: Medieval and Early Modern Times
Grade Eight: United States History and Geography: Growth and Conflict

Grades Nine Through Twelve

Historical and Social Sciences Analysis Skills

The California State Board of Education has established grade nine history-social science as an elective yeare no standards for grade nine. Districts are urged to offer a suitable range of electives as outlined in the I Social Science Framework, pp. 118-124.

Grade Ten: World History, Culture, and Geography: The Modern World
Grade Eleven, United States History and Geography, Continuity and Change in the Twentieth Century
Grade Twelve, Principles of American Democracy and Economics

Questions: State Board of Education | 9

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California State Board of Education 1430 N Street, Suite #5111 Sacramento, CA 95814

Contact CDE | Web Policy | Feedback

Last Modified: Monday, March 28, 2005

K.1 Students understand that being a good citizen involves acting in certain ways.

- 1. Follow rules, such as sharing and taking turns, and know the consequences of breaking them.
- 2. Learn examples of honesty, courage, determination, individual responsibility, and patriotism in American and world hist stories and folklore.
- Know beliefs and related behaviors of characters in stories from times past and understand the consequences of the c actions.

3.4 Students understand the role of rules and laws in our daily lives and the basic structure of the U government.

- 1. Determine the reasons for rules, laws, and the U.S. Constitution; the role of citizenship in the promotion of rules and lacconsequences for people who violate rules and laws.
- 2. Discuss the importance of public virtue and the role of citizens, including how to participate in a classroom, in the comr in civic life.
- 3. Know the histories of important local and national landmarks, symbols, and essential documents that create a sense of among citizens and exemplify cherished ideals (e.g., the U.S. flag, the bald eagle, the Statue of Liberty, the U.S. Const Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Capitol).
- 4. Understand the three branches of government, with an emphasis on local government.
- 5. Describe the ways in which California, the other states, and sovereign American Indian tribes contribute to the making nation and participate in the federal system of government.
- 6. Describe the lives of American heroes who took risks to secure our freedoms (e.g., Anne Hutchinson, Benjamin Frankl Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Frederick Douglass, Harriet Tubman, Martin Luther King, Jr.).

5.7 Students describe the people and events associated with the development of the U.S. Constitution analyze the Constitution's significance as the foundation of the American republic.

- 1. List the shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation as set forth by their critics.
- 2. Explain the significance of the new Constitution of 1787, including the struggles over its ratification and the reasons for of the Bill of Rights.
- 3. Understand the fundamental principles of American constitutional democracy, including how the government derives its from the people and the primacy of individual liberty.
- Understand how the Constitution is designed to secure our liberty by both empowering and limiting central government compare the powers granted to citizens, Congress, the president, and the Supreme Court with those reserved to the st
- 5. Discuss the meaning of the American creed that calls on citizens to safeguard the liberty of individual Americans withir nation, to respect the rule of law, and to preserve the Constitution.
- 6. Know the songs that express American ideals (e.g., "America the Beautiful," "The Star Spangled Banner").

8.3 Students understand the foundation of the American political system and the ways in which citiz participate in it.

- 1. Analyze the principles and concepts codified in state constitutions between 1777 and 1781 that created the context out American political institutions and ideas developed.
- 2. Explain how the ordinances of 1785 and 1787 privatized national resources and transferred federally owned lands into holdings, townships, and states.
- 3. Enumerate the advantages of a common market among the states as foreseen in and protected by the Constitution's c interstate commerce, common coinage, and full-faith and credit.
- 4. Understand how the conflicts between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton resulted in the emergence of two poparties (e.g., view of foreign policy, Alien and Sedition Acts, economic policy, National Bank, funding and assumption c revolutionary debt).
- 5. Know the significance of domestic resistance movements and ways in which the central government responded to suc movements (e.g., Shays' Rebellion, the Whiskey Rebel-lion).
- 6. Describe the basic law-making process and how the Constitution provides numerous opportunities for citizens to partic political process and to monitor and influence government (e.g., function of elections, political parties, interest groups).
- 7. Understand the functions and responsibilities of a free press.

11.1 Students analyze the significant events in the founding of the nation and its attempts to realize philosophy of government described in the Declaration of Independence.

- 1. Describe the Enlightenment and the rise of democratic ideas as the context in which the nation was founded.
- 2. Analyze the ideological origins of the American Revolution, the Founding Fathers' philosophy of divinely bestowed una natural rights, the debates on the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, and the addition of the Bill of Rights.
- 3. Understand the history of the Constitution after 1787 with emphasis on federal versus state authority and growing dem
- 4. Examine the effects of the Civil War and Reconstruction and of the industrial revolution, including demographic shifts a emergence in the late nineteenth century of the United States as a world power.

11.3 Students analyze the role religion played in the founding of America, its lasting moral, social, a political impacts, and issues regarding religious liberty.

- 1. Describe the contributions of various religious groups to American civic principles and social reform movements (e.g., a human rights, individual responsibility and the work ethic, antimonarchy and self-rule, worker protection, family-centere communities).
- 2. Analyze the great religious revivals and the leaders involved in them, including the First Great Awakening, the Second Awakening, the Civil War revivals, the Social Gospel Movement, the rise of Christian liberal theology in the nineteenth impact of the Second Vatican Council, and the rise of Christian fundamentalism in current times.
- 3. Cite incidences of religious intolerance in the United States (e.g., persecution of Mormons, anti-Catholic sentiment, ant
- 4. Discuss the expanding religious pluralism in the United States and California that resulted from large-scale immigratior twentieth century.
- 5. Describe the principles of religious liberty found in the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment the debate on the issue of separation of church and state.

Motion Related Documents

2:05-cv-00017-LKK-DAD Newdow et al v. Congress of the United States of America et al

U.S. District Court

Eastern District of California - Live System

Notice of Electronic Filing

The following transaction was received from Pott, Michael William entered on 5/16/2005 at 6:01 PM PDT and filed on 5/16/2005

Case Name:

Newdow et al v. Congress of the United States of America et al

Case Number:

2:05-cv-17

Filer:

Sacramento City Unified School District

Elk Grove School District

Elverta Joint Elementary School District

Rio Linda Unified School District

Steven Ladd

M Magdalena Carrillo Mejia

Dianna Mangerich Frank S Porter

Document Number: 51

Docket Text:

REQUEST for JUDICIAL NOTICE by Elk Grove School District, Steven Ladd, M Magdalena Carrillo Mejia, Dianna Mangerich, Frank S Porter, Sacramento City Unified School District, Elverta Joint Elementary School District, Rio Linda Unified School District. (Attachments: # (1) Exhibit A Volume I# (2) Exhibit A Volume II# (3) Exhibit B)(Pott, Michael)

The following document(s) are associated with this transaction:

Document description: Main Document

Original filename:n/a

Electronic document Stamp:

[STAMP dcecfStamp_ID=1064943537 [Date=5/16/2005] [FileNumber=421453-0] [alaebe56bdc923bdc9cbf24d9dfae4dee4fcd97d026fb864bcd2920999f0e1c97e8d 0b3044c42a06d196bf63e944e9e8093236ebcc018bee12475b2b2daa3d86]]

Document description: Exhibit A Volume I

Original filename:n/a

Electronic document Stamp:

[STAMP dcecfStamp_ID=1064943537 [Date=5/16/2005] [FileNumber=421453-1] [8b51fca454f1440fc55f6ed1f4aeadf20203581fa97015e7987168c089a790a73bdd 6fd9c771caa7f0e4226ee45e838869559888ee93403937dbf1cf269fff2a]]

Document description: Exhibit A Volume II

Original filename:n/a

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2c71022eab47b0c6757b34d96624d2891750fec404f197a7c8ee49f0b992]]

Document description: Exhibit B

Original filename:n/a

Electronic document Stamp:

[STAMP dcecfStamp_ID=1064943537 [Date=5/16/2005] [FileNumber=421453-3] [514f78364cf86adff436cc19b2f697e2bc3cc0e414aa01153549314162544d9db4fe f335eb534e19fb2031298cafcc0567ebea0bf690da731eb56812b0e0878e]]

2:05-cv-17 Notice will be electronically mailed to:

Craig Manning Blackwell craig.blackwell@usdoj.gov

Jill Bowers jill.bowers@doj.ca.gov, autumn.owens@doj.ca.gov,ecfcoordinator@doj.ca.gov

Terence John Cassidy tcassidy@pswdlaw.com, sschiele@pswdlaw.com

Derek Lewis Gaubatz dgaubatz@becketfund.org,

Michael Arthur Newdow NewdowLaw@cs.com

Michael William Pott mpott@pswdlaw.com, padams@pswdlaw.com

2:05-cv-17 Notice will be delivered by other means to:

WEIBERG & DELEHANT *PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 150 UNIVERSITY AVE. SUITE 2006 PO. BOX 255428 SACRAMENTO, CA 95865

19161 929-1481 www.pswdlaw.com Attorneys for Defendants ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. STEVEN LADD, SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. M. MAGDALENA CARRILLO MEJIA, ELVERTA JOINT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. DIANNA MANGERICH, RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT and FRANK S. PORTER respectfully request that the Court take judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 201 and relevant case law of the following item:

1. The policies of the Defendant School Districts challenged by Plaintiffs relating to voluntary recitation of the Pledge. A true and correct copy of the Defendant School Districts' policies are attached hereto as Exhibits A, B, C and D. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, these policies are "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."

Dated: July 8, 2005

Respectfully submitted,

PORTER, SCOTT, WEIBERG & DELEHANT A Professional Corporation

By /s/ Terence J. Cassidy

Terence J. Cassidy

Attorney for Defendants

EGUSD, Dr. Steven Ladd, SCUSD, Dr. M.

Magdalena Carrillo Mejia, EJESD, Dr. Dianna

Mangerich, RLUSD and Frank S. Porter

LAW OFFICES OF PORTER, SCOTT. 28
WEIBERG & DELEHANT APROPESSIONAL CORPORATION 190 L'UNIVERSITY AVE. 8,317: 200
P.O. BOX 25420
SACRAMENTO, CA 95865
(916) 929-1481
WWW.pswdlow.com

Exhibit A

Instruction AR 6115

CEREMONIES AND OBSERVANCES

Patriotic Observances Elementary Schools

Each elementary school class recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag once each day.

Secondary Schools

At some period during the day, a suitable patriotic observance shall be observed in every classroom. The observance for the day shall be uniform throughout the school and shall be selected by a committee appointed by the principal. Examples of suitable observances:

- 1. A pledge of allegiance to the flag.
- 2. The reading of a passage from one of our great American historical documents.
- 3. The reading of a quotation from one of our great American figures.
- 4. Appropriate remarks commemorating an important event in our history.
- 5. Appropriate remarks along with the observance of the birthdate of great American historical figures.

Special Days and Events

Commemoration of special days and events shall be arranged to the end that the effective observation of these occasions is a definite and valuable part of the school program.

Declaration of holiday(s) may be made by the governing board when good reason exists. (Education Code 37222)

Legal Reference:

EDUCATION CODE

37220-37232 Saturdays and holidays

37227.6 Day of the Teacher

045203 Paid holidays

52720 -Daily performance of patriotic

exercises in public schools

Regulation

ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Approved:

October 29, 1984

Elk Grove, California

Exhibit B

Holidays

District schools shall be closed in observance of the following holidays:

New Year's Day January 1

Dr. Martin Luther Third Monday in January or the

King, Jr. Day Monday or Friday of the week in

which January 15 occurs

Lincoln Day The Monday or Friday of the week

in which February 12 occurs

Washington Day Third Monday in February

Memorial Day Last Monday in May

Independence Day July 4

Labor Day First Monday in September

Veteran's Day November 11

Thanksgiving Day That Thursday in November

designated by the President

Christmas Day December 25

(cf. 6141.2 - Recognition of Religious Beliefs and Customs)

Holidays which fall on a Sunday shall be observed the following Monday. Holidays which fall on a Saturday shall be observed the preceding Friday. If any of the above holidays occurs under federal law on a date different from that indicated above, the Board may close the schools on the date recognized by federal law instead of on the date above. (Education Code 37220)

(cf. 6111 - School Calendar)

Commemorative Exercises

District schools shall hold exercises to commemorate the following special days:

U.S. Constitution Day On or near September 17

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Day The Friday before the day schools are closed for this holiday

Lincoln's Birthday The school day before the day

schools are closed for this

holiday

Susan B. Anthony Day February 15

George Washington's Birthday The Friday preceding the

third Monday in February

Black American Day March 5

Conservation, Bird and Arbor Day March 7

Classified Employee Week Third Week in May

Cesar Chavez Day March 31

California Poppy Day April 6

John Muir Day April 21

Day of the Teacher Second Wednesday in May

Patriotic Exercises

Each school shall conduct patriotic exercises daily. At elementary schools, such exercises shall be conducted at the beginning of each school day. The Pledge of Allegiance to the flag will fulfill this requirement. (Education Code 52720)

Individuals may choose not to participate in the flag salute for personal reasons.

(cf. 5145.2 - Freedom of Speech/Expression: Publications Code)

Display of Flag

The flag of the United States and the flag of California shall be displayed during school days at the entrance or on the grounds of every school. At all times, the national flag shall be placed in the position of first honor. (Government Code 431, 436; 36 USC 174)

Upon order of the President, the national flag shall be flown at half-mast upon the death of principal figures of the United States government and the Governor of the state, as a mark of respect to their memory. When so flown, the flag shall be hoisted to the top of the staff for an instant before being lowered to half-mast. It should be hoisted to the peak again before being lowered for the night. (36 USC 175)

The national flag shall fly at half mast: (36 USC 175)

. 45**4** 2 01 2

- 1. For 30 days from the death of the President or a former President.
- 2. For 10 days from the death of the Vice President, the Chief Justice or a retired Chief Justice, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
- 3. From the day of death until burial of an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, a former Vice President, a member of the Cabinet, a Secretary of the Army, Navy or Air Force, and the Governor of the state.
- 4. On the day of death and the following day for a Member of Congress.

Regulation SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

approved: November 16, 1998 Sacramento, California

reviewed: June 11, 2002

Exhibit C

Holidays

District schools shall be closed in observance of the following holidays:

New Year's Day January 1

Dr. Martin Luther Third Monday in January or the

King, Jr. Day Monday or Friday of the week in

which January 15 occurs

Lincoln Day The Monday or Friday of the week

in which February 12 occurs

Washington Day Third Monday in February

Memorial Day Last Monday in May

Independence Day July 4

Labor Day First Monday in September

Veterans Day November 11

Thanksgiving Day That Thursday in November

designated by the President

Christmas Day December 25

(cf. 6141.2 - Recognition of Religious Beliefs and Customs)

Holidays which fall on a Sunday shall be observed the following Monday. Holidays which fall on a Saturday shall be observed the preceding Friday. If any of the above holidays occurs under federal law on a date different from that indicated above, the Board may close the schools on the date recognized by federal law instead of on the date above. (Education Code 37220)

Commemorative Exercises

The District schools shall observe special days with suitable exercises.

Patriotic Exercises

Each school shall conduct patriotic exercises daily. At elementary schools, such exercises shall be conducted at the beginning of each school day. The Pledge of Allegiance to the flag will fulfill this requirement. (Education Code 52720)

Individuals may choose not to participate in the flag salute for personal reasons.

(cf. 5145.2 - Freedom of Speech/Expression: Publications Code)

Display of Flag

The flag of the United States and the flag of California shall be displayed during school days at the entrance or on the grounds of every school. At all times, the national flag shall be placed in the position of first honor. (Government Code 431, 436; 36 U.S.C. 174)

Regulation RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT

reviewed: February 10, 1998 Rio Linda, California

Exhibit D

Holidays

District schools shall be closed in observance of the following holidays and additional days as specified in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

New Year's Day January 1

Dr. Martin Luther Third Monday in January or the

King, Jr. Day Monday or Friday of the week in which January 15 occurs

Lincoln Day The Monday or Friday of the week in which February 12 occurs

Washington Day The Monday or Friday of the week in which February 22 occurs.

Memorial Day Last Monday in May

Independence Day July 4

Labor Day First Monday in September

Veteran's Day November 11

Thanksgiving Day That Thursday in November designated by the President

Christmas Day December 25

(cf. 6141.2 - Recognition of Religious Beliefs and Customs)

Holidays which fall on a Sunday shall be observed the following Monday. Holidays which fall on a Saturday shall be observed the preceding Friday. If any of the above holidays occurs under federal law on a date different from that indicated above, the Board may close the schools on the date recognized by federal law instead of on the date above. (Education Code 37220)

(cf. 6111 - School Calendar)

Commemorative Exercises

District schools shall hold exercises to commemorate the following special days:

U.S. Constitution Day On or near September 17

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Day The Friday before the day schools are closed for this holiday

Lincoln's Birthday The school day before the day schools are closed for this holiday

Susan B. Anthony Day February 15

George Washington's Birthday The Friday preceding the third Monday in February

Black American Day March 5

Conservation, Bird and Arbor Day March 7

Classified Employee Week Third Week in May

In addition, the Board has authorized schools to hold commemorative exercises for the following additional special days:

School Board Recognition Month January

Week of the School Administrator First full week of March

Cesar Chavez Day March 31

California Poppy Day April 6

John Muir Day April 21

Day of the Teacher Second Wednesday in May

Native American Day Fourth Friday in September

Bill of Rights Day December 15

Patriotic Exercises

Each school shall conduct patriotic exercises daily. At elementary schools, such exercises shall be conducted at the beginning of each school day. The Pledge of Allegiance to the flag will fulfill this requirement. (Education Code 52720)

Individuals may choose not to participate in the flag salute for personal reasons.

Display of Flag

The flag of the United States and the flag of California shall be displayed during school days at the entrance or on the grounds of every school. At all times, the national flag shall be placed in the position of first honor. (Government Code 431, 436; 36 USC 174)

Upon order of the President, the national flag shall be flown at half-staff upon the death of principal figures of the United States government and the Governor of a state, as a mark of respect to their memory. In the event of death of other officials or foreign dignitaries, the flag shall be displayed at half-staff according to Presidential instructions or orders, or in accordance with recognized customs or practices not inconsistent with law. In the event of the death of a present or former official of the government of any state, the Governor may proclaim that the flag be flown at half-staff. (36 USC 175)

In addition, the national flag shall fly at half-staff: (36 USC 175)

1. For 30 days from the death of the President or a former President

- 2. For 10 days from the death of the Vice President, the Chief Justice or a retired Chief Justice, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives
- 3. From the day of death until internment of an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, a secretary of executive or military department, former Vice President, and the Governor of a state
- 4. On the day of death and the following day for a Member of Congress

Regulation ELVERTA ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT

approved: February 11, 2002 Elverta, California

Motion Related Documents

2:05-cv-00017-LKK-DAD Newdow et al v. Congress of the United States of America et al

U.S. District Court

Eastern District of California - Live System

Notice of Electronic Filing

The following transaction was received from Pott, Michael William entered on 7/8/2005 at 6:15 PM PDT and filed on 7/8/2005

Case Name:

Newdow et al v. Congress of the United States of America et al

Case Number:

2:05-cv-17

Filer:

Sacramento City Unified School District

Elk Grove School District

Elverta Joint Elementary School District

Rio Linda Unified School District

Steven Ladd

M Magdalena Carrillo Mejia

Dianna Mangerich Frank S Porter

Document Number: 70

Docket Text:

REQUEST for JUDICIAL NOTICE by Elk Grove School District, Steven Ladd, M Magdalena Carrillo Mejia, Dianna Mangerich, Frank S Porter, Sacramento City Unified School District, Elverta Joint Elementary School District, Rio Linda Unified School District *in Support of Reply.* (Pott, Michael)

The following document(s) are associated with this transaction:

Document description: Main Document

Original filename:n/a

Electronic document Stamp:

[STAMP dcecfStamp_ID=1064943537 [Date=7/8/2005] [FileNumber=510451-0] [258018b235406115257e9ae2096b9531585a00584f29b641e822ac3454e7076921a13 fa43923a841544cb6e968c40c59d7ba13594c6fe2df9268a403a339f6de]]

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Craig Manning Blackwell craig.blackwell@usdoj.gov

Jill Bowers jill.bowers@doj.ca.gov, autumn.owens@doj.ca.gov,ecfcoordinator@doj.ca.gov

Terence John Cassidy tcassidy@pswdlaw.com, sschiele@pswdlaw.com

Derek Lewis Gaubatz dgaubatz@becketfund.org,

Michael Arthur Newdow NewdowLaw@cs.com

Michael William Pott mpott@pswdlaw.com, padams@pswdlaw.com

2:05-cv-17 Notice will be delivered by other means to:

Jared N. Leland Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 1350 Connecticut Avenue NW Suite 605 Washington, DC 20036

Anthony R. Picarello Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 1350 Connecticut Avenue NW Suite 605 Washington, DC 20036

Eric C. Rassbach Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 1350 Connecticut Avenue NW Suite 605 Washington, DC 20036



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NO. CIV. S-05-17 LKK/DAD

Plaintiffs,

THE REV. DR. MICHAEL A. NEWDOW, et al.,

THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

TO BE PUBLISHED

Pending before the court are motions to dismiss in what is something of a cause celebre in the ongoing struggle as to the role of religion in the civil life of this nation. Below, I conclude that binding precedent requires a narrow resolution of the motions, one which will satisfy no one involved in that debate, but which accords with my duty as a judge of a subordinate court.

As is known by most everyone, plaintiff, Michael Newdow ("Newdow"), is an atheist whose daughter attends school in the Elk Grove Unified School District ("EGUSD"). He and two other sets of

parents and their minor children¹ bring suit to challenge the constitutionality of 4 U.S.C. § 4, which codifies the wording of the Pledge of Allegiance, and the practices of four California public school districts requiring students to recite the Pledge.² Plaintiffs bring suit against the United States of America, the United States Congress, and Peter LeFebre, a congressional officer (collectively "federal defendants"). The complaint also names as defendants the State of California, the Governor of California, California's Education Secretary (collectively "state defendants"), and four local California public school districts and their superintendents (collectively "school districts").³ The school districts sued are the Elk Grove Unified School District ("EGUSD"), Sacramento City Unified School District ("SCUSD"), Elverta Joint Elementary School District ("EJESD"), and the Rio Linda School District ("RIUSD").⁴ The immediate causes of this order are the

These plaintiffs are identified as Jan Doe and Pat Doe (parents) and Doe Child (minor child), and Jan Roe (parent) and Roechild-1 and Roechild-2 (minor children).

² Plaintiffs bring claims under the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Pls.' First Amended Compl. at 14-16. They also bring claims under Article XVI, Section 5, Article I, Section 4, and Article IX, Section 8 of the California State Constitution. <u>Id</u>. at 19-20.

³ Plaintiffs bring suit against the school districts' superintendents, but in their opposition, they concede that the superintendents should be dismissed. Opp'n at 27:4-6.

Plaintiffs request the following relief:

a. A declaration that Congress, in passing the Act of 1954, violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses;

motions to dismiss filed by the federal and state defendants, as well as the school districts.

I.

BACKGROUND

A. STATUTES AT ISSUE

1. Federal Statute

The Pledge of Allegiance was initially conceived as part of the commemoration of the 400th anniversary of Christopher Columbus' arrival in America. See Elk Grove School Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2306 (citation omitted) (hereinafter referred to as "Elk Grove" to avoid confusion with the various other Newdow decisions issued along the way to the Supreme Court). In 1942, as part of an effort "to codify and emphasize the existing rules and customs pertaining to the display and use of the flag of the United States of America," Congress enacted a Pledge of Allegiance to the flag. H.R. Rep. No. 2047, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1942); S. Rep. No. 1477, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1942). It read: "I pledge

b. A declaration that by including "under God" in the Pledge, 4 U.S.C. § 4 violates the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses;

c. That Congress immediately remove the words "under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance, as written in 4 U.S.C. \S 4;

d. To demand that defendant Peter LeFevre, Law Revision Counsel, immediately act to remove the words "under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance as written in 4 U.S.C. §

e. To demand defendant Schwarzenegger and Richard J. Riordan immediately repeal Education Code § 52720 or end its enforcement;

f. To demand that the School Districts forbid the use of the now-sectarian Pledge of Allegiance; and

e. Costs, expert witness fees, attorney fees.

allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Act of June 22, 1942, ch. 435, § 7, 56 Stat. 380.

Twelve years later, Congress amended the Pledge of Allegiance by adding the words "under God" after the word "Nation." Act of June 14, 1954, ch. 297, § 7, 68 Stat. 249. The Pledge of Allegiance now reads: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." 4 U.S.C. § 4. The House Report that accompanied that legislation observed that, "[f]rom the time of our earliest history our peoples and our institutions have reflected the traditional concept that our Nation was founded on a fundamental belief in God." H.R. Rep. No. 1693, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2 (1954).

2. California Statute and School Districts' Policy

California law requires that each public elementary school in the State "conduct[] appropriate patriotic exercises" at the beginning of the school day, and that "[t]he giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America shall satisfy the requirements of this section." Cal. Educ. Code § 52720.

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Plaintiffs allege that the EGUSD has adopted Rule AR 6115, which provides in pertinent part:

Each school shall conduct patriotic exercises daily. At elementary schools, such exercises shall be conducted at the beginning of each school day. The Pledge of Allegiance to the flag will fulfill this requirement.

6 Pl.'s Compl. at 8.5

The EGUSD allowed students who object on religious grounds to abstain from the recitation. Elk Grove, 124 S.Ct at 2306.

B. PRIOR LITIGATION

In March 2000, Newdow filed an almost identical suit in this district. At the time of filing, Newdow's daughter was enrolled in kindergarten in the EGUSD and participated in daily recitation of the Pledge. The complaint alleged that Newdow had standing to sue on his own behalf and on behalf of his daughter as a "next

Each school shall conduct patriotic exercises daily. At elementary schools, such exercises shall be conducted at the beginning of each school day. The pledge of allegiance will fulfill this requirement Individuals may choose not to participate in the flag salute for personal reasons.

Exs. B, C, D, Defs.' Req. for Jud. Ntc.

⁵ It appears that plaintiffs are confused as to what the District requires, since plaintiffs also allege that EGUSD requires that "[e]ach elementary school class [shall] recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag once each day." Plaintiff Newdow states that he has been unable to confirm that EJESD has implemented a similar requirement but that RoeChild-1 is being led in such a daily recitation. Pls.' Compl. at 8, n. 4. Defendants, however, have submitted the AR 6115 for each of the school districts. As plaintiffs allege, EGUSD's policy states that "[e]ach elementary school class [shall] recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag once each day." Ex. A, Defs.' Req. for Jud. Ntc. (filed July 8, 2005). AR 6115 of SCUSD, RLUSD, and EESJD states:

friend."

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The original case was referred to Magistrate Judge Nowinski, who recommended dismissal of the suit, concluding that the Pledge does not violate the Establishment Clause. Judge Schwartz adopted the findings and recommendations and dismissed Newdow's complaint on July 21, 2000. In the course of appeal, the Ninth Circuit issued three separate decisions which are briefly reviewed below.

1. Ninth Circuit Cases

a. "Newdow I"

In its first opinion, the Circuit held that Newdow had standing as a parent to challenge practices that interfere with his right to direct the religious education of his daughter. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Newdow I"). The Appellate Court found that both the 1954 Act and the School District's policy violated the Establishment Clause.

b. "Newdow II"

After the Court of Appeals rendered its initial opinion,
Sandra Banning, the mother of Newdow's daughter, filed a motion for
leave to intervene, or alternatively to dismiss the complaint. She
declared that she and Newdow shared "physical custody" of their
daughter. She asserted that her daughter is a Christian who
believes in God and has no objection to the recitation of the
Pledge or to hearing others recite the Pledge. On September 25,
2002, the California Superior Court entered an order enjoining
Newdow from including his daughter in the lawsuit.

The Ninth Circuit reconsidered Newdow's standing and held that the "grant of sole legal custody to Banning" did not deprive Newdow, as a noncustodial parent, of Article III standing to object to unconstitutional government action affecting his child. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 313 F.3d 500, 502-03 ("Newdow II"). The court concluded that under California law Newdow retained the right to expose his child to his religious views even if such views differed from the mother's, and that he retained his own right to seek redress for alleged injuries to his parental interests. Id. at 504-5.

c. "Newdow III"

On February 28, 2003, the Ninth Circuit issued an order amending its first opinion and denying rehearing en banc. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 2003). The amended opinion omitted Newdow I's discussion of Newdow's standing to challenge the 1954 Act and also declined to determine whether Newdow was entitled to declaratory relief regarding the Act's constitutionality, explaining that because the district court did not discuss whether to grant declaratory relief it would also decline to reach that issue. Id. at 490. The court, however, continued to hold that the school district's policy violated the Establishment Clause.

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⁶ Nine judges dissented from the denial of en banc review.

2. Supreme Court Case ("Elk Grove")

On June 14, 2004, the Supreme Court considered the Ninth's Circuit's decision. It held that, given the California court's order, Newdow lacked prudential standing to bring suit in federal court. Id. The Court also examined Newdow's other claimed bases for standing, which are similar to those claimed here. It held that Newdow's claim that he attended and will continue to attend classes with his daughter in the future, that he has considered teaching elementary school students, that he has attended and continues to attend school board meetings where the Pledge is recited were insufficient to respond to the court's prudential concerns. Id. at n. 8. The majority also concluded that Newdow's taxpayer standing argument failed because it did not amount to the "direct dollars-and-cents injury" that Doremus v. Bd. of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) requires. Id.

II.

THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE PRESENT COMPLAINT

A. PLAINTIFF MICHAEL NEWDOW

Plaintiff Michael Newdow is a resident and citizen of the United States, of the State of California, and of Sacramento County. He is the owner of property situated in Elk Grove and in Sacramento and pays taxes that are used to fund the EGUSD, the SCUSD, and their respective schools. He is the father of a child

⁷ In the first suit, Newdow claimed he had taxpayer standing because he indirectly paid taxes by virtue of his child custody payments.

enrolled in one of EGUSD's schools. Compl. at 2.

Plaintiff Newdow alleges that he is an atheist who denies the existence of any god. Compl. at 9, 13. He claims that he would like to run for public office but he objects to governmental use of sectarian religious dogma. Id. at 10. He has the joint legal custody of his child, who lives with him approximately 30% of the time. He concedes that the mother of his child currently has final decision-making authority. Id. He alleges, however, that the mother of his child is required to fully consult him prior to making any significant decision regarding the care of their child.

Newdow avers that his child is forced to experience teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance every morning, even though he has requested the principal of his child's school and the EGUSD that the practice be discontinued. Newdow volunteers in his child's classroom, and on some of those occasions, the teacher has led the students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. He also alleges that he has attended the EGUSD and SCUSD school board meetings, where the Pledge of Allegiance is recited under the direction of the Boards. Id. at 9.

B. PLAINTIFFS JAN AND PAT DOE, AND DOE CHILD

Plaintiffs Jan Doe and Pat Doe are residents and citizens of the United States, of the State of California, and of Sacramento County. They own property in Elk Grove and pay taxes that are used to fund the EGUSD and its schools. They are the parents of Doe child, with full legal custody of that child. Doe child is a seventh grade student enrolled in one of EGUSD's schools. Compl.

at 2.

Jan and Pat Doe are atheists who deny the existence of God. The Does allege that the Pledge of allegiance is recited in Doe child's classes. Jan and Pat Doe have also attended EGUSD school board meetings where the Pledge is recited, causing the Does to cease attending school board meetings. The Does have attended their child's classes and other events where the Pledge has been recited. They have written to the principal of their child's school, asking that the Pledge not be recited in their child's classrooms, but were not provided with any such assurance. Compl. at 11.

Plaintiffs allege that Doe child is an atheist who denies the existence of God. They contend that Doe child has been forced to experience the recitation of the Pledge that has been led by public school teachers in the class and at assemblies. Plaintiff Doe child has suffered harassment by other students due to Doe child's refusal to participate in the Pledge. Compl. at 11.

C. PLAINTIFFS JAN ROE AND ROECHILD-1 AND ROECHILD-2

Plaintiff Jan Roe is a resident and citizen of the United States, of the State of California, and of Sacramento County. ⁸ Jan Roe is also the owner of property situated in the Elverta area of Sacramento county. Roe pays taxes that are used to fund the EJESD

⁸ It is unclear from the complaint whether Roe is the father or mother of the Roe children. The defendants refer to this plaintiff as he, and the court follows that practice. The court apologizes if, in fact, this plaintiff is the mother rather than the father of the Roe children.

and its schools. He is the parent of RoeChild-1 and RoeChild-2, with full joint legal custody of those children. Jan Roe is an atheist who denies the existence of God. He alleges that the Pledge has been recited in both of his children's classes. He has written to the principals of both schools, asking that the Pledge not be recited in the children's classes, but has not been provided any assurances that this would happen. Roe has been present in the classes of both children while their teachers have led their classes in reciting the Pledge.

Plaintiff RoeChild-1 is a third grade student enrolled in one of the EJESD's schools. RoeChild-1 is a pantheist, who denies the existence of a personal God. She has been forced to experience the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in her classes and has been led by her teachers in her class and at assemblies in reciting the Pledge. Compl. at 12.

Plaintiff RoeChild-2 is a kindergarten student enrolled in one of RLSD's schools. Compl. at 2. RoeChild-2 has been forced to experience the reciting of the Pledge of Allegiance in class and at school assemblies. Compl. at 12. Even though RoeChild-2's teachers know about Jan Roe's objections to the Pledge, they have been unable to devise any way "to avoid the indoctrination without other adverse effects to RoeChild-2." Compl. at 12.

D. OTHER ALLEGATIONS

Each adult plaintiff claims that he or she has been made to feel like a "political outsider" due to the "government's embrace of (Christian) monotheism in the Pledge of Allegiance." Compl. at

13. The parents contend that they are deeply involved in the education of their children, and that they have attempted to participate in school matters, but once their atheism becomes known, it interferes with their ability to "fit in" and "effect changes within the political climate of parent-teacher associations, [and] school board meetings." Id. Finally, the adult plaintiffs maintain that they are placed in an untenable situation requiring them "to choose between effectiveness as an advocate for his or her child's education, and the free exercise clause of his or her religious beliefs." Id.

III.

DISMISSAL STANDARDS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (6)

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded" allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id.; see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963) (inferring fact from allegations of complaint).

In general, the complaint is construed favorably to the pleader. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). So construed, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure

to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle him or her to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). In spite of the deference the court is bound to pay to the plaintiff's allegations, however, it is not proper for the court to assume that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

IV.

ANALYSIS

Pending before the court are motions to dismiss filed by all defendants. Before turning to the substantive claims made by plaintiffs, the court must resolve the issue of standing.

A. STANDING

To bring suit in a federal court, a party must establish standing to prosecute the action. Elk Grove, 124 S.Ct. at 2308. The familiar three part test for standing requires pleading that the plaintiff "(1) . . . has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will

be redressed by a favorable decision." Friends of the Earth,

Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 180-81

(2000) (citation omitted).

The defendants do not challenge the standing of Doe plaintiffs, and it clear that Doe plaintiffs have standing to challenge a practice that interferes with their right to direct their children's religious education. See Doe v. Madison Sch.

Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Parents have a right to direct the religious upbringing of their children, and on that basis, have standing to protect their right."). Thus, Doe plaintiffs have standing to challenge EGUSD's policy and practice regarding the recitation of the Pledge because DoeChild is enrolled in the seventh grade.

Defendants do, however, contend that Newdow and the Roe plaintiffs lack standing. I address defendants' contentions below. 9

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⁹ It is true that "the general rule applicable to federal court suits with multiple plaintiffs is that once the court determines that one of the plaintiffs has standing, it need not decide the standing of others." See Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Thus, it is arguable that it is unnecessary to consider Newdow and the Roes' standing.

Nonetheless, the court believes that it must consider the standing of each plaintiff since they challenge the Pledge practice in districts in which the Doe children are not registered.

1. Newdow

a. Parental Standing

Newdow asserts claims against both EGUSD and SCUSD. In addition to suing as "next friend" for his child, he also contends that he has standing to sue because he has attended government meetings, including school board meetings, where the Pledge has been administered, and that he is a state taxpayer and owns property in Elk Grove and Sacramento, and pays local property taxes to support their school districts. 10

I turn first to whether Newdow has standing as a parent to challenge the school districts' policies, and conclude that he lacks prudential standing. In his opposition to the motion, Newdow appears to concede that the custody arrangement has not changed since the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Elk Grove concluding that he was without standing. Whatever the personal relationship Newdow has with his daughter, 11 the Supreme Court has made clear that "having been deprived under California law of the right to sue as next friend, Newdow lacks prudential standing to bring this suit in federal court." Elk Grove, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2312 (2004).

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 $^{\,^{10}\,}$ The Roe defendants make similar claims concerning their school districts.

Newdow alleges that "there has never been any indication that his love of, care for or dedication to his child is anything less than that of the most wonderful and devoted parent on Earth." Opp'n at 5.

b. Additional Grounds

As he did in the previous litigation, Newdow also asserts additional bases for standing, namely that he has attended school board meetings where the Pledge is recited, and that he has taxpayer standing.

As to the attendance assertion of standing, the Supreme Court concluded that even if "these arguments suffice to establish Article III standing, they do not respond to our prudential concerns." <u>Elk Grove</u>, 124 S.Ct. at 2312, n.8. I am, of course, bound by the holding.

As for taxpayer standing, in the previous litigation,

Newdow admitted that he did not reside in or pay taxes to the
school district, but argued that he paid taxes through child
support payments to the child's mother. As noted above, the

Court rejected this argument because it did not "amount to the
'direct dollars-and-cents injury.'" This case presents a

different issue. In this lawsuit, Newdow alleges that he is the
owner of real property in Sacramento and in Elk Grove, and "pays
the associated local property taxes in both locales." Compl.
at 10.

Defendants give short shrift to plaintiffs' taxpayer

The other plaintiffs make similar claims. Doe plaintiffs allege that they are residents of Sacramento, California and are owners of real property located in Sacramento and pay the associated local property taxes. Part of those taxes, they allege, goes to the EGUSD. Compl. at 11. Plaintiff Jane Roe maintains that he is a resident of Elverta, California and is the owner of real property in Elverta, California and pays the associated local property taxes. <u>Id.</u> at 12.

standing, citing the Supreme Court's analysis in <u>Elk Grove</u>.

That argument simply does not address the present taxpayer standing argument premised on the plaintiff's status as a property owner. <u>See</u> Fed. Defs.' Mot. at 17, School Dists.' Mot. at 14, State Defs.' Mot. at 4-5. Nonetheless, as I now explain, plaintiffs' taxpayer standing argument must fail.

Establishment Clause exception to the general rule against federal taxpayer standing. Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 1991) ("This notion of standing is consistent with the traditional judicial hospitality extended to Establishment Clause challenges by taxpayers generally.") (citations omitted). Even so, plaintiffs challenge the use of municipal and state rather than federal tax revenues. Consequently, Doremus v. Board of Educ. of Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429 (1952), controls the requirements for taxpayer standing. To establish standing under Doremus, a plaintiff must merely allege that the activity challenged "is supported by any separate tax or paid for from any particular appropriation or that it adds any sum whatever to the cost of conducting the school." Id. at 433.

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In <u>Doremus</u>, a taxpayer challenged a state statute that provided for the reading of verses from the Bible at the beginning of each school day. The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer lacked standing because the action was not a "good-faith pocketbook" challenge to the state statute. 342 U.S. at 430.

Plaintiffs argue that "teachers' salaries alone" in one school district at issue are approximately \$138 million and that if reciting "under God" adds approximately 1.25 seconds to the Pledge, saying "under God" costs the taxpayers in said district more than \$5,000 per year. <u>Id</u>. at 119. The argument does not lie.¹⁴

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Under Doremus and Doe, "the taxpayer must demonstrate that the government spends 'a measurable appropriation or disbursement of school-district funds occasioned solely by the activities complained of.'" Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (U.S. 1952)). see also Taxpayers' Suits, A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895, 922 (1960) (Doremus "stands for the proposition that a state or municipal taxpayer does not have a direct enough interest for his suit to constitute an article III case or controversy unless the activity challenged involves an expenditure of public funds which would not otherwise be made." Doe, 177 F.3d at 794). While plaintiffs' argument is ingenious, it cannot prevail. Under Doremus, plaintiffs must prove that the words "under God" "adds cost to the school expenses or varies by more than an incomputable scintilla " 431. Plaintiffs' calculations fail because teachers in this

Plaintiffs expressly state that they have no objection to the recitation of the Pledge. Comp. at 21. Their only objection is to the inclusion of the phrase "under God," and suggest a return to the pre-1954 version of the Pledge.

state are not paid on an hourly basis, and thus the few seconds a day relied on simply do not meet the test. I conclude that Newdow lacks standing and his claim relative to the state and district defendants must be dismissed. 15

2. Roe Plaintiffs

Defendants challenge whether Jan Roe has standing to bring suit in this litigation. In the first amended complaint, Jan Roe states that he is the parent of RoeChild-1 and RoeChild-2, with full legal custody of those children. Compl. at 2.

Defendants contend that "this statement is insufficient to support a finding that Plaintiffs Jan Roe and Roe children are proper parties to raise this dispute." Fed. Defs.' Mot. at 15.

Defendants assert that plaintiffs have "failed to allege that Jan Roe has final-decision-making authority regarding the educational upbringing of Roe Children." Id.

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Newdow also asserts that he would like to run for public office but that he believes doing so would be futile because of the public's antipathy towards atheism. He believes his inability to obtain elected office "is due in part to the official endorsement of monotheism contained in the Pledge." The court will assume arguendo standing since it is clear that the argument simply has no merit. Acknowledging that there is public antipathy directed towards atheists, common experience teaches that the Pledge has no bearing on that fact.

Defendants explain that they have attempted to resolve this issue without the court's involvement and asked plaintiff's counsel for clarification. Cassidy Decl. \P 2. In response, plaintiffs' counsel provided Jan Roe's declaration and a family law stipulation and order indicating that Jan Roe has joint legal and joint physical custody of Roe children. The parties have not submitted Jan Roe's declaration for the court's consideration. Defendants also explain that Newdow has indicated that the current custody arrangement of Roe children is likely to be changing as a new arrangement is in the process of being negotiated. <u>Id</u>. \P 4.

In Elk Grove, the Supreme Court's admonished that "it is 1 improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by a plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family rights that are in dispute when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person who is the source of plaintiff's 5 standing." 124 S.Ct. at 2312. That conclusion has no bearing on the instant case since there is no indication that family rights are in dispute with regard to the Roe children. important to recall that what is before the court is a motion to dismiss, requiring that the court give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-11 pleaded" allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. 12 13 Ass'n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff need not plead a particular 14 15 fact if that fact is a reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id.; see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 16 17 648 (1963) (inferring fact from allegations of complaint). Plaintiff has properly alleged that he has custody of his 18 children and thus by reasonable inference decision-making power 19 20 over them, and defendant has tendered nothing to rebut that 21 inference. The court concludes that plaintiff Roe has 22 sufficiently pled standing. 23 Having resolved the standing question, I turn to the

Having resolved the standing question, I turn to the substance of the complaint. As I explain below, the court concludes that it is bound by the Ninth Circuit's previous determination that the school district's policy with regard to

the pledge is an unconstitutional violation of the children's right to be free from a coercive requirement to affirm God. The court also concludes, however, that by virtue of that determination, the claims concerning the Pledge itself are rendered moot.

B. RECITATION OF THE PLEDGE IN THE CLASSROOM

1. Binding Effect of Newdow III

In <u>Newdow III</u>, the Ninth Circuit amended its previous opinion, declining to rule on the constitutionality of the federal statute at issue in this litigation, and also declining to reach whether it must grant Newdow's claim for declaratory relief as to that statute. The court, however, continued to hold, as it did in <u>Newdow I</u>, that the Elk Grove School District's practice of teacher-led recitation of the Pledge "aims to inculcate in students a respect for the ideals set forth in the Pledge, including the religious values it incorporates." I must now address the binding effect of the Ninth Circuit's holding in <u>Newdow III</u>.

While the Supreme Court ruled in <u>Elk Grove</u> that plaintiff
Newdow lacked prudential standing to raise the claim and
reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in <u>Newdow III</u>, the High
Court did not address the Ninth Circuit's conclusion concerning
the school district's policy. Thus, the question is what effect
the reversal on other grounds of <u>Newdow III</u> by <u>Elk Grove</u> has
upon this court's freedom to consider anew plaintiffs' claims
and defendants' oppositions.

It is established that there is a distinction between a case being reversed on other grounds and a case being vacated. A decision that is reversed on other grounds may still have precedential value, whereas a vacated decision has no precedential authority. See Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1424 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1991) ("A decision may be reversed on other grounds, but a decision that has been vacated has no precedential authority whatsoever."); see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 2495 (1975) ("Of necessity our decision vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals deprives that court's opinion of precedential effect . . . ").

During oral argument, counsel for the federal defendants argued that the Ninth Circuit lacked authority as a jurisdictional matter to proceed on the merits in Newdow III, and thus, the decision is a nullity, citing Steel Co. v.

Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). I cannot agree that I am free, as defense counsel urges, to take a "fresh look" at the matter. Defendants' argument rests on an erroneous premise, that there is no distinction between prudential standing and Article III standing. Indeed, however, the Supreme Court in Steel Co. recognized the distinction, and limited its holding to Article III standing. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 97 ("The latter question is an issue of statutory standing. It has nothing to do with whether there is a case or controversy under Article III.").

Prudential standing and Article III standing are distinct.

Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 16 ("[0]ur standing jurisprudence contains two strands: Article III standing, which enforces the Constitution's case or controversy requirement; and prudential standing, which embodies 'judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction[.]'") (citations omitted). Important to the present issue is that in Elk Grove, the Supreme Court determined that Newdow lacked prudential standing but did not dispute the existence of Article III standing. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 29 ("the Court does not dispute that respondent Newdow . . . satisfies the requisites of Article III standing") (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

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When a court lacks Article III standing, there is no jurisdiction because there is no case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution. A federal court, however, may reach the merits when only prudential standing is in dispute.

See, e.g., American Iron and Steel Institute v. Occupational Safety and Health Admin., 182 F.3d 1261, 1274 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Steel Co., supra, for the proposition that "courts cannot pretermit Article III standing issues, but can pretermit prudential standing issues, in order to resolve cases where the merits are relatively easy"); Environmental Protection Information Center, Inc. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 257 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (suggesting review of the merits prior to a prudential standing determination is proper where "the parties"

retain a stake in the controversy satisfying Article III"). In sum, because a court may reach the merits despite a lack of prudential standing, it follows that where an opinion is reversed on prudential standing grounds, the remaining portion of the circuit court's decision binds the district courts below. Contrary to the urging that a "fresh look" is demanded by Steel
Co., this court remains bound by the Ninth Circuit's holding in Newdow III.

2. The Newdow III decision

In Newdow III, the Ninth Circuit applied the "coercion test" formulated by the Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman, 505

U.S. 577, 580 (1992), and concluded that the district's pledge policy "impermissibly coerces a religious act." The court determined that the school district's policy, like the school's action in Lee of including prayer at graduation ceremonies, "places students in the untenable position of choosing between participating in an exercise with religious content or protesting." The court observed that the "coercive effect of the policy here is particularly pronounced in the school setting given the age and impressionability of schoolchildren . . ."

Newdow III, 328 F.3d at 488. Finally, the court noted, that non-compulsory participation is no basis for distinguishing it

¹⁷ In Lee, a public school student and her father sought a permanent injunction to prevent the inclusion of invocations and benedictions in graduation ceremonies of city public schools. The Supreme Court held that public schools could not provide for "nonsectarian" prayer to be given by a clergyman selected by the school.

from West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), where the Court held unconstitutional a school district's wartime policy of punishing students who refused to recite the Pledge and salute the flag. 18 The Ninth Circuit concluded that even without a recitation requirement for each child, "the mere presence in the classroom every day as peers recite the statement 'one nation under God' has a coercive effect." Newdow III, 328 F.3d at 488. "The 'subtle and indirect' social pressure which permeates the classroom also renders more acute the message to non-believing school-children that they are outsiders." <u>Id</u>. (citing <u>Lee</u>, 505 U.S. at 592-93). The court then determined that "there can be little doubt that under the controlling Supreme Court cases, the school district's policy fails the coercion test." Id. Accordingly, the court held that "the school district's policy and practice of teacher-led recitation of the Pledge, with the inclusion of the added words 'under God,' violates the Establishment Clause." Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466, 490 (9th Cir. 2002).

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The EGUSD school policy at issue in this litigation, and which affect Newdow and the Doe plaintiffs, is identical to the one in the prior litigation. As noted above, defendants have submitted AR 6115 for EJESD which, on its face, does not mandate daily recitation of the Pledge. Plaintiff, however, alleges that in any case RoeChild-1 is being led in such a daily

 $^{^{18}}$ <u>Barnette</u> was decided before the 1954 Act added the words "under God" to the Pledge.

recitation. That allegation suffices to bring the complaint within the ambit of § 1983 which provides jurisdiction to restrain unconstitutional customs or usage, i.e., practice.¹⁹

Because this court is bound by the Ninth Circuit's holding in Newdow III, it follows that the school districts' policies violate the Establishment Clause. Accordingly, upon a properly-supported motion, the court must enter a restraining order to that effect. Because of that conclusion, however, as I explain below, it follows that the plaintiffs' federal claims are rendered moot.

3. Mootness

The doctrine of mootness restricts judicial power to live cases and controversies. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 559-61 (1992). As with Article III standing, "[t]he federal courts lack power to make a decision unless the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact, traceable to the challenged action, and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Snake River Farmers' Ass'n v. Dept. of Labor, 9 F.3d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 1993). If one of these required prerequisites to the exercise of judicial power is absent, the judicial branch loses its power to render a decision on the merits of the claim. Nome Eskimo Community v. Babbitt, 67 F.3d

²⁴ lg Again, the complaint alleges that in each of the minor plaintiffs' classes, there is teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance every morning, and that each child has suffered by virtue thereof, and that the parents' ability to guide their childrens' religious beliefs have been adversely affected.

813 (9th Cir. 1995).

In the case at bar, the plaintiffs' claims, in so far as they relate to the in-class pledges, are resolved because the Ninth Circuit has held that the school policy mandating the Pledge is unconstitutional, and as the court indicated above, upon proper motion it will issue an appropriate injunction.

Upon the issuance of that injunction, plaintiffs will no longer suffer from an injury-in-fact which would require redress from this court. Thus, any claims relating to federal statute must be dismissed.

C. PLEDGE RECITATION AT SCHOOL BOARD MEETINGS AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL MEETINGS

Aside from the allegations related to the school districts' compulsory administration of the Pledge to student-plaintiffs, the complaint also alleges that each of the parents have, independent of their relationship to their offspring, cognizable claims. Specifically, the adult plaintiffs assert that they have attended school board meetings where the Pledge has been recited. Compl. at 9-12.20 These parent-plaintiffs submit

As noted above, the Supreme Court held that Newdow lacks prudential standing to raise this argument, <u>Elk Grove</u>, 124 S.Ct. at 2312, n.8, but plaintiffs Doe and Roe arguably have standing to bring this claim. Plaintiffs argue that they have standing to bring this suit as it applies to the Pledge being recited at school board meetings because they are forced to "confront government-sponsored religious dogma." Compl. at 9. Plaintiffs cite to cases where physical religious structures are erected on federal land. See Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 1240 (2005); <u>ACLU v. McCreary County</u>, 361 F.3d 928 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 944 (2005); <u>Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU</u>, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). The Ninth

that when they are faced with the Pledge of Allegiance, "a significant hurdle arises, interfering with an ability to 'fit in' and effect changes within the climate of parent-teacher associations, school board meetings, and the like." Id. at ¶ 92. In essence, plaintiffs argue that they are branded with a "political outsider" status. Id. at ¶ 91.

Plaintiffs' arguments must be rejected. The Pledge itself does not compel recitation anywhere, at any time. Thus, properly understood, plaintiffs are complaining about a school board policy or practice. Yet the present complaint does not seek relief from that practice but attacks the content of the Pledge, which is significant only because of that practice. Even it this were not the case, however, the present status of Establishment Clause jurisprudence compels rejection of plaintiffs' claim in this regard.

It cannot be gainsaid that the practice of reciting the Pledge in the context of adults attending a school board meeting tenders a different question than the recitation of the Pledge in a classroom. In Lee v. Weisman, the case upon which the Newdow III court relied, the Supreme Court explained the inherent differences between religious activity involving

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Circuit has repeatedly held that inability to unreservedly use public land suffices as injury-in-fact. <u>Buono v. Norton</u>, 371 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2004). The instant case is distinguishable from this line of cases because it does not involve physical structures. The court, however, need not rule on plaintiffs' standing as it relates to the school board meetings because, as explained, plaintiffs have failed to plead a cognizable claim.

students in a public school system and, for instance, a prayer said at the opening of a session of a state legislature, the issue at bar in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). In Lee, the court emphasized "recognition [of] the real conflict of consequence by the young student." Lee, 505 U.S. at 596. In contrast the Court explained:

[t]he atmosphere at the opening of a session of a state legislature where adults are free to enter and leave with little comment and for any number of reasons cannot compare with the constraining potential of the [the student's graduation]. . . .

Id.

Plaintiffs' claim must be rejected because both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court have applied the coercion test and the "outsider" status claim with great restraint, recognizing it only in the context of children who are more likely to be pressured and negatively impacted. Here, plaintiffs are adults who, like the legislators in Marsh, are "free to enter and leave" at the opening of a school board session. 21

For all the above reasons, the motion to dismiss the parents' suit relative to school board meetings must be granted.

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This court is, of course bound by the distinction noted above, but as the saying goes, it is not gagged. The cramped view of the Establishment Clause underlying the distinction between Marsh and Lee ignores a primary function of the First Amendment; namely, to act as a bulwark barring the introduction of sectarian division into the body politic, and thus advancing the ideal of national unity.

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CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the court ORDERS as follows:

- 1. Defendants' motions to dismiss the claim as to the recitation of the Pledge in a classroom is DENIED; and
- 2. As to all the other causes of action, the motion is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 22

DATED: September 14, 2005.

/s/Lawrence K. Karlton
LAWRENCE K. KARLTON
SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

This court would be less than candid if it did not acknowledge that it is relieved that, by virtue of the disposition above, it need not attempt to apply the Supreme Court's recently articulated distinction between those governmental activities which endorse religion, and are thus prohibited, and those which acknowledge the Nation's asserted religious heritage, and thus are permitted. As last terms cases, McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 2005 WL 1498988 (2005) and $\underline{\text{Van Orden v. Perry}}$, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 2005 WL 1500276 (2005) demonstrate, the distinction is utterly standardless, and ultimate resolution depends of the shifting, subjective sensibilities of any five members of the High Court, leaving those of us who work in the vineyard without quidance. Moreover, because the doctrine is inherently a boundaryless slippery slope, any conclusion might pass muster. It might be remembered that it was only a little more than one hundred ago that the Supreme Court of this nation declared without hesitation, after reviewing the history of religion in this country, that "this is a Christian nation." Church of the Holy Trinity v. United <u>States</u>, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892). As preposterous as it might seem, given the lack of boundaries, a case could be made for substituting "under Christ" for "under God" in the pledge, thus marginalizing not only atheists and agnostics, as the present form of the Pledge does, but also Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Confucians, Sikhs, Hindus, and other religious adherents who, not only are citizens of this nation, but in fact reside in this judicial district.

1 2 3 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THE REV. DR. MICHAEL A. NEWDOW, et al., 12 NO. CIV. S-05-17 LKK/DAD 13 Plaintiffs, 14 v. ORDER 15 THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 The court's September 14, 2005 order is amended at 30:21, 18 footnote 22, to add the word "years" following the phrase "one 19 hundred." 20 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 DATED: September 14, 2005. 23 <u>/s/Lawrence K. Karlton</u> 24 LAWRENCE K. KARLTON SENIOR JUDGE 25 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 26

1 PORTER, SCOTT, WEIBERG & DELEHANT A Professional Corporation Terence J. Cassidy, SBN 099180 Michael W. Pott, SBN 186156 350 University Avenue, Suite 200 Sacramento, California 95825 (916) 929-1481 4 (916) 927-3706 (facsimile) 5 Attorneys for Defendants ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, EL VERTA JOINT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT and RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL 6 DISTRICT 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THE REV. DR. MICHAEL A. NEWDOW Case No.: CIV 05-0017 LKK DAD IN PRO PER, JAN DOE AND PAT DOE, 13 PARENTS; DOECHILD, A MINOR CHILD; JAN ROE; PARENT; ROECHILD-14 AND ROECHILD-2, MINOR DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST CHILDREN, AMENDED 15 COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR Plaintiffs, JURY TRIAL 16 VS. THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 17 STATES OF AMERICA; THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; THE STATE OF 18 THE ELK CALIFORNIA: GROVE SCHOOL 19 UNIFIED DISTRICT ("EGUSD"); DR. STEVEN 20 SUPERINTENDENT, EGUSD; SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL ("SCUSD"); DR. 21 DISTRICT MAGDALENA CARRILLO MEJIA SUPERINTENDENT, SCUSD: ELVERTA JOINT ELEMENTARY 23 SCHOOL DISTRICT ("EJESD"); DR. DIANNA MANGERICH 24 SUPERINTENDENT, EJESD; THE RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT 25 "RLUSD"); FRANK S. PORTER, SUPERINTÉNDENT, RLUSD; 26 Defendants. 27 28 ///

LAW OFFICES OF PORTER, SCOTT, 28 WEIBERG & DELEHANT FROF ESSIONAL CORPORATION 30 ENTYPERSTY ARE, SUITE 200 F.O. 80X 235428 SACRAMENTO, CA 95865 (916) 929-1481 www.pswdlaw.com

LAW OFFICES OF
PORTER, SCOTT,
WEIBERG & DELEHANT
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
90 UNIVERSITY AVE. SUITE 200
PO. BOX 13648
SACRAMENTO, CA 95865
(916) 929-1481
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Come now Defendants ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, ELVERTA JOINT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT and RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT (referred to herein as "SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendants") and answer Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint as follows:

- 1. Answering paragraph 1, these answering Defendants admit that jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331. Answering the remaining allegations contained in said paragraph, these answering Defendants contend that the remaining allegations are conclusions of law and not averments of fact to which an answer is required, but insofar as an answer may be deemed required, generally and specifically deny each and every remaining allegation contained in said paragraph.
- 2. Answering paragraph 2, these answering Defendants deny the allegations contained in said paragraph.
- 3. Answering paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6, these answering Defendants contend that the allegations in these paragraphs pertain to parties that are no longer Defendants in this case and therefore no answer is required. Insofar as an answer may by required, these answering Defendants lack sufficient information or knowledge to enable them to answer the allegations contained in said paragraphs and basing their denial on that ground, generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
- 4. Answering paragraph 7, these answering Defendants admit the allegations contained in said paragraph.
- 5. Answering paragraph 8, these answering Defendants admit that their place of business is in Sacramento County, California and that venue is therefore proper. Answering the remaining allegations contained in said paragraph, these answering Defendants lack sufficient information or knowledge to enable them to answer the remaining allegations contained in said paragraph, and basing their denial on that ground, generally and specifically deny each and every remaining allegation contained in said paragraph.
- 6. Answering paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, these answering Defendants admit the allegations contained in said paragraphs.

- 7. Answering paragraph 12, these answering Defendants lack sufficient information or knowledge to enable them to answer the allegations contained in said paragraph, and basing their denial on that ground, generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraph.
- 8. Answering paragraphs 13 and 14, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
- 9. Answering paragraphs 15 and 17, these answering Defendants contend that said paragraphs contain conclusions of law and not averments of fact to which an answer is required, but insofar as an answer is required, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
- 10. Answering paragraph 18, these answering Defendants contend that the allegations in said paragraph pertain to a party that is no longer a Defendant in this case and therefore no answer is required. Insofar as an answer may by required, these answering Defendants lack sufficient information or knowledge to enable them to answer the allegations contained in said paragraph and basing their denial on that ground, generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraph.
- 11. Answering paragraphs 16 and 19, these answering Defendants lack sufficient information or knowledge to enable them to answer the allegations contained in said paragraphs, and basing their denial on that ground, generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
- 12. Answering paragraphs 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, these answering Defendants admit the allegations contained in said paragraphs.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF

13. Answering paragraphs 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, and 37, these answering Defendants contend that said paragraphs contain conclusions of law and not averments of fact to which an answer is required, but insofar as an answer may be deemed required, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.

- 14. Answering paragraphs 38 and 39, these answering Defendants lack sufficient information or knowledge to enable them to answer the allegations contained in said paragraphs, and basing their denial on that ground, generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
- 15. Answering paragraph 40, these answering Defendants admit that the words "under God" were added to the Pledge of Allegiance by the Act of 1954. Answering the remaining allegations contained in said paragraph, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every remaining allegation contained in said paragraph.
- 16. Answering paragraphs 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, these answering Defendants contend that said paragraphs contain conclusions of law and/or arguments to which an answer is not required, but insofar as an answer may be deemed required, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every allegations contained in said paragraphs.
- 17. Answering paragraph 56, these answering Defendants admit that Plaintiffs have never been actually compelled to say the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. Answering the remaining allegations contained in said paragraph and the accompanying footnote, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every remaining allegation contained in said paragraph.
- 18. Answering paragraphs 57, 58, and 59, these answering Defendants lack sufficient information or knowledge to enable them to answer the allegations contained in said paragraphs, and basing their denial on that ground, generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
- 19. Answering paragraph 60, these answering Defendants admit that NEWDOW is the biological father of a child currently attending the EGUSD and that he does not have final decision making authority with respect to the educational upbringing of that child. Answering the remaining allegations contained in said paragraph, these answering Defendants lack sufficient information or knowledge to enable them to answer the remaining allegations contained in said paragraph, and basing their denial on that ground, generally and

LAW OFFICES OF PORTER SCOTT, 28 PORTER SCOTT, 28 PORTERS & DELEHANT REOFESSIONAL CORPORATION 10 UNIVERSITY AVE. SUITE 200 P.O. BOX 254343 SACRAMENTO, CA 95865 (916) 929-1481

specifically deny each and every remaining allegation contained in said paragraph.

- 20. Answering paragraph 61, these answering Defendants admit that NEWDOW's child has in the past and is presently voluntarily reciting the Pledge of Allegiance with the words "under God". Answering the remaining allegations contained in said paragraph, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every remaining allegation contained in said paragraph.
- 21. Answering paragraph 62, 63, and 64, these answering Defendants contend that no answer is required to these paragraphs based on that portion of the District Court ruling granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiff NEWDOW, but insofar as an answer may be deemed required, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
- 22. Answering paragraph 65, these answering Defendants lack sufficient information or knowledge to enable them to answer the allegations contained in said paragraph and basing their denial on that ground, generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraph.
- 23. Answering paragraphs 66, these answering Defendants admit the allegations contained in said paragraph.
- 24. Answering paragraphs 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84 and 85 these answering Defendants lack sufficient information or knowledge to enable them to answer the allegations contained in said paragraphs, and basing their denial on that ground, generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
- 25. Answering paragraph 82, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraph.
- 26. Answering paragraph 86 these answering Defendants admit that Plaintiff RoeChild-2 is a student at a public school administered by RLUSD, answering the reaming allegations these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every remaining allegation contained in said paragraph.

- 27. Answering paragraphs 87 and 88, these answering Defendants lack sufficient information or knowledge to enable them to answer the allegations contained in said paragraphs, and basing their denial on that ground, generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs
- 28. Answering paragraphs 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96 and 97, these answering Defendants lack sufficient information or knowledge to enable them to answer the allegations contained in said paragraphs, and basing their denial on that ground, generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
- 29. Answering paragraphs 98, 99, 101 and 102, and each of the footnotes referred to therein, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
- Answering paragraphs 100, 103 and 104, and each of the footnotes referred to 30. therein, these answering Defendants lack sufficient information and knowledge to enable them to answer the allegations contained in said paragraphs, and basing their denial on that ground, generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
- 31. Answering paragraph 105, these answering Defendants admit the allegations contained in said paragraph.
- Answering paragraphs 106, 107, 108 and 109, and each of the footnotes 32. referred to therein, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
- Answering paragraphs 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114, these answering Defendants 33. lack sufficient information or knowledge to enable them to answer the allegations contained in said paragraphs, and basing their denial on that ground, generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
- Answering paragraphs 115, 116, 117, 118 and 119, and each of the footnotes 34. referred to therein, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.

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AW OFFICES OF

LAW OFFICES OF
PORTER, SCOTT,
WEIBERG & DELEHANT
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
650 UNIVERSITY AVE. SUITE 200
P.O. BOX 255-28
SACRAMENTO. CA 95865
(916) 929-1481

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- 35. Answering paragraphs 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125 and 126, and each of the footnotes referred to therein, these answering Defendants lack sufficient information or knowledge to enable them to answer the allegations contained in said paragraphs, and basing their denial on that ground, generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
- 36. Answering paragraphs 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132 and 133, and each of the footnotes referred to therein, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
- 37. Answering paragraphs 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 and 166, and each of the appendixes or footnotes referred to therein, these answering Defendants lack sufficient information or knowledge to enable them to answer the allegations contained in said paragraphs, and basing their denial on that ground, generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
- 38. Answering paragraph 167, these answering Defendants admit that EGUSD, SCUSD, EJESD, and RLUSD are all governmental entities obliged to ensure that the Constitution of the United States of America is upheld. Answering the remaining allegations contained in said paragraph, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every remaining allegation contained in said paragraph.
- 39. Answering paragraph 168, these answering Defendants admit that DR. STEVEN LADD, DR. M. MAGDALENA CARRILLO MEJIA, DR. DIANNA MANGERICH and FRANK S. PORTER are all individuals serving in governmental capacity who have an obligation to ensure the Constitution of the United States of America is upheld. Answering the remaining allegations contained in said paragraph, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every remaining allegation contained in said paragraph.
- 40. Answering paragraph 169, these answering Defendants admit that EGUSD, SCUSD, EJESD and RLUSD are all governmental entities obliged to ensure the Constitution

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of the United States of America is upheld. Answering the remaining allegations contained in said paragraph, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every remaining allegation contained in said paragraph.

- 41. Answering paragraph 170, 171, 172, 174 and 175, and each of the appendixes referred to therein, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
- 42. Answering paragraph 173, these answering Defendants contend that said paragraph contains conclusions and not averments to fact to which an answer is deemed required, but insofar as an answer may be deemed required, these answering Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every allegation contained in said paragraph.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The First Amended Complaint, in its entirety and through each separately stated cause of action, fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' claims, and each of them, are barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and/or res judicata.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' claims, and each of them, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' claims and each of them are barred by the doctrine of laches.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the claims being asserted in this action.

WHEREFORE, Defendants ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, ELVERTA JOINT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT and RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT pray for judgment as follows:

1. That Plaintiffs' action be dismissed;

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LAW OFFICES OF
PORTER, SCOTT,
YEIBERG & BELEHANT
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
SUNIVERSITY AVE. SUITE 106
P.O. 80X.24528
SACRAMENTO, CA 95865
(916) 929-1481
www.pswdlaw.com

PORTER, SCOTT, WEIBERG & DELEHANT

A Professional Corporation Terence J. Cassidy, SBN 099180 Michael W. Pott, SBN 186156 350 University Avenue, Suite 200 Sacramento, California 95825

(916) 929-1481

(916) 927-3706 (facsimile)

Attorneys for Defendants ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. STEVEN LADD, SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. M. MAGDALENA CARRILLO MEJIA, ELVERTA JOINT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. DIANNA MANGERICH, RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT and FRANK S. PORTER.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE REV. DR. MICHAEL A. NEWDOW IN PRO PER, JAN DOE AND PAT DOE. PARENTS; DOECHILD, A MINOR CHILD: JAN ROE; PARENT; ROECHILD-AND ROECHILD-2, MINOR CHILDREN,

Case No.: CIV 05-0017 LKK DAD

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL AND ORDER

Plaintiffs.

VS.

THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE UNITED 18 STATES OF AMERICA; THE STATE OF 19 CALIFORNIA; THE ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

DR. STEVEN LADD. 20 ("EGUSD"): SUPERINTENDENT EGUSD:

SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL ("SCUSD"): DISTRICT DR. MAGDALENA CARRILLO MEJIA.

SUPERINTENDENT, SCUSD: THE ELVERTA JOINT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT

UCT ("EJESD"); DR. MANGERICII, DIANNA SUPERINTENDENT, EJESD; THE RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT

("RLUSD"); FRANK S. PORTER. SUPERINTENDENT, RLUSD;

Defendants.

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STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL AND ORDER

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LAW OFFICER OF	
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25	UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT and FRANK S. PORTER
24	DR. DIANNA MANGERICH, RIO L'INDA UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT and FRANK
23	DISTRICT, DR. M. MAGDALENA CARRILLO MEJIA, EL VERTA JOINT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
22	DISTRICT, DR. STEVEN LADD, SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL
21	Attorney for Defendants ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT DR. STEVEN LADD
20	Michael W. Pott
19	By MWC-
18	
17	Dated: 10/25/05 PORTER, SCOTT, WEIBERG & DELEHANT A Professional Corporation
16	Doted: 0425/45
15	ROE; PARÊNT; ROECHILD-1 AND ROECHILD-2, MINOR CHILDREN
14	JAN DOE AND PAT DOE, PARENTS; DOECHILD, A MINOR CHILD; JAN
13	Counsel for Plaintiffs THE REV. DR. MICHAEL A. NEWDOW IN PROPER,
12	Michael A. Newdow
11	- m. M
10	Dated: 240cros
9	All parties are to bear their own fees and costs.
8	lawsuit of ROECHILD-1 and the ELVERTA JOINT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT.
7	ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT. This stipulation will result in the dismissal from this
5	Complaint in its entirety without prejudice as it pertains to ELVERTA JOINT
5	Pott, hereby stipulate that Plaintiffs JAN ROE and ROECHILD-1 are dismissing the
3 4	ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT by and through its counsel of record, Michael W.
2 3	JAN ROE; PARENT; ROECHILD-1 AND ROECHILD-2, MINOR CHILDREN, by and through their counsel of record, Michael A. Newdow, and Defendant ELVERTA JOINT
1	Plaintiffs JAN DOE AND PAT DOE, PARENTS; DOECHILD, A MINOR CHILD;
1	Plaintiffe IAN DOE AND BAT DOE BARENTS, DOECHII D. A MINOR CHII D.

1	IT IS SO ORDERED.
2	Dated: 10/26/05 Jawrere Kautto
3	Lawrence K. Karlton Judge of the United States District Court
4	Judge of the Office Builds District Court
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 THE REV. DR. MICHAEL

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A. NEWDOW, et al.,

13 Plaintiffs,

THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

On October 11, 2005, the court ordered plaintiffs to file affidavits in support of an injunction regarding their standing and the merits. Defendants were ordered to file a motion for summary judgment as to Elverta Joint Elementary School District, if appropriate. Defendants were also ordered to file responsive affidavits, if any.

The court is in receipt of the parties' affidavits and motions. On October 25, 2005, the parties stipulated that plaintiffs Jan Roe and RoeChild-1 are dismissing the complaint in

NO. CIV. S-05-17 LKK/DAD

ORDER

its entirety as it pertains to Elverta Joint Elementary School District, resulting in the dismissal from this lawsuit of Roechild-1 and the Elverta Joint Elementary School District.

On November 16, 2005, Elk Grove Unified School District ("EGUSD") moved to dismiss plaintiffs Jan Doe, Pat Doe and DoeChild's claims against it. Defendant EGUSD explains that the declaration of DoeChild filed in support of the request for a permanent injunction establishes that he or she currently attends one of EGUSD's middle schools and that his or her teacher does not lead the students in reciting the Pledge, and that the last time the Pledge was recited in his or her classroom was last year. thus contend that because DoeChild is no longer in elementary school, he or she is not affected by EGUSD's Patriotic Observances Elementary School Administrative Regulation which states that "[e]ach elementary school class [shall] recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag once each day." Mot. at 2. The court has confirmed that DoeChild is currently a student in one of EGUSD's Middle Schools and that DoeChild's teacher does not lead him or her in saying the Pledge. DoeChild Decl. at $\P\P$ 4, 9.2

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Defendants explained that they were not made aware of the fact that the Doe plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a claim against EGUSD until October 24, 2005.

 $^{^2}$ The Pledge of Allegiance is not recited on a daily basis in EGUSD middle and high schools. Pursuant to EGUSD AR 6115, the Pledge is just one way that secondary schools may satisfy the patriotic observance requirement of Education Code § 52720. Ladd Decl. at § 4.

With respect to EGUSD, in the First Amended Complaint filed on behalf of plaintiffs, the policy complained of applies only elementary schools. Because plaintiff DoeChild is no longer in elementary school, the Doe plaintiffs are unable to establish an injury-in-fact that provides them standing to challenge the EGUSD Patriotic Observance Policy and they fail to meet the legal standard for issuance of a permanent injunction. DoeChild states that he or she is afraid that the "Pledge will be recited again every day next year" and that "this will be a bigger problem," but this fear is insufficient to constitute actual injury or imminent harm. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Svcs. Inc., 52 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (To have standing, injury or harm must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or speculation). Accordingly, based on the declarations and papers filed herein, the court hereby ORDERS as follows:

- 1. Doe plaintiffs are DISMISSED on the ground that they lack standing to challenge the EGUSD Elementary School Pledge Policy.

 As a result, EGUSD is DISMISSED as a defendant in this case.
- 2. Defendant Rio Linda School District is PROHIBITED from applying its Board Policy AR 6115 to the extent the policy requires the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance so as to fulfill the patriotic exercise requirement of California Education Code Section 52720. Employees and agents of defendant Rio Linda School District are also enjoined from leading students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance for the purpose of satisfying the patriotic exercise requirement of California Education Code 52720.

3. The permanent injunction issued by this Court as to Rio Linda School District is hereby STAYED pending the resolution of any and all appeals regarding this matter brought before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 18, 2005.

/s/Lawrence K. Karlton
LAWRENCE K. KARLTON
SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



1	The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty Derek L. Gaubatz, Esq.* (C.B.N. 208405)	•			
2	Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., Esq. Jared N. Leland, Esq.				
3					
	Eric C. Rassbach, Esq. Washington, DC 20036-1735				
4	Telephone: (202) 955-0095 Facsimile: (202) 955-0090				
5	Counsel for Defendants				
6	* Counsel of Record				
7					
8	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA				
9					
10)			
11	THE REV. DR. MICHAEL A. NEWDOW, et al.				
12	Plaintiffs,)			
13	V.) 2:05-cv-00017-LKK-DAD			
14	31)			
15	THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.	 Notice of Appeal of Defendant-Intervenors John Carey et al. 			
16	$\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{A})$				
17	Defendants,)			
18	and)			
19	JOHN CAREY, et al.)			
20	Defendant-Intervenors.				
21)			
22	NOTICE OF A	APPEAL OF			
23	DEFENDANT-INTERVENORS JOHN CAREY, ET AL.				
24	Notice is hereby given that John Carey,	Adrienne Carey, Brenden Carey, Adam Araiza,			
25	Albert Araiza, Anita Araiza, Michaela Bishop, Craig Bishop, Marie Bishop, Teresa Declines, Daries				
26	Declines, Ryanna Declines, Rommel Declines, Janice Declines, Anthony Doerr, Dan Doerr, Karen				
27	Doerr, Sean Forschler, Tiffany Forschler, Fred Fo				
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	Notice of Appeal of Defendant-	Intervenors John Carey, et al.			

1	McKay, Sharon McKay, and the Knights of Columbus, Defendant-Intervenors in the above-named				
2	case, hereby appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from that portion of				
3	this Court's November 18, 2005 Order granting Plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction and				
4	that portion of this Court's September 14, 2005 Order denying Defendants' and Defendant-				
5	Intervenors' motions to dismiss.				
6		Respectfully submitted,			
7					
8		/s/ Derek L. Gaubatz The Posket Fund for Policious Liberty			
9		The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty Derek L. Gaubatz, Esq.* (C.B.N. 208405)			
10	·	Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., Esq. Jared N. Leland, Esq.			
11		Eric C. Rassbach, Esq. 1350 Connecticut Avenue NW			
12		Suite 605			
13		Washington, DC 20036-1735 Telephone: (202) 955-0095			
14		Facsimile: (202) 955-0090			
15	Date: November 21, 2005	Counsel for Defendant-Intervenors John Carey et al. *Counsel of Record			
16		Counsel of Record			
17					
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28	Notice of Anneal of D	2 efendant-Intervenors John Carey, et al.			
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PORTER, SCOTT, WEIBERG & DELEHANT A Professional Corporation Terence J. Cassidy, SBN 099180 Michael W. Pott, SBN 186156 350 University Avenue, Suite 200 Sacramento, California 95825 (916) 929-1481 (916) 927-3706 (facsimile) 5 Attorneys for Defendants ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. STEVEN LADD, SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. M. MAGDALENA 6 CARRÍLLO MEJIA, ELVERTA JOINT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. DIANNA MANGERICH, RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT and FRANK S. 7 PORTER 8 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 Case No.: CIV 05-0017 LKK DAD THE REV. DR. MICHAEL A. NEWDOW IN PRO PER, JAN DOE AND PAT DOE. DEFENDANT RIO LINDA UNION 14 PARENTS; DOECHILD, A MINOR SCHOOL DISTRICT'S NOTICE OF CHILD; JAN ROE; PARENT; ROECHILD-AND APPEAL 15 ROECHILD-2, MINOR CHILDREN, 16 Plaintiffs. 17 VS. 18 THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 19 STATES OF AMERICA; THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA; ELK 20 THE GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT ("EGUSD"): DR. STEVEN 21 SUPERINTENDENT. EGUSD: SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL 22 ("SCUSD"); DISTRICT DR. 23 MAGDALENA CARRILLO MEJIA. SUPERINTENDENT, SCUSD: ELEMENTARY JOINT 24 ELVERTA SCHOOL DISTRICT ("EJESD"); DR. MANGERÍCH 25 DIANNA SUPERINTENDENT, EJESD; THE RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT 26 ("RLUSD"): FRANK S. PORTER, SUPERINTENDENT, RLUSD; 27 Defendants. BERG & DELEHANT PESSIONAL CORPORATION NIVERSITY AVE. SUITE 200 PO BOX 255428

DEFENDANT RLUSD'S NOTICE OF APPEAL

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LAW OFFICES OF

PORTER, SCOTT,

ACRAMENTO, CA 95865 (916) 929-1481 www.pswdlaw.com

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Dated: December 9, 2005

LAW OFFICES OF
PORTER, SCOTT.
WEI BERG & DELETIANT
NEGOFESSIONAL COMPORATION
150 UNIVERSITY AVE. SUITE 200
PORX 235428
SACRAMENTO, CA. 95865
(916) 929-1481

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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Defendant RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT hereby appeals to the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from Orders entered in this action on 14th day of September, 2005 and the 18th day of November, 2005, by U.S. District Court Senior Judge Lawrence K. Karlton, denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and granting Plaintiffs' Motion for a Permanent Injunction, respectively.

The Representation Statement and Civil Appeal Docketing Statement are attached as required by the Ninth Circuit Local Rules 3-2 and 3-4. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a copy of the September 14, 2005 Order and as Exhibit "B" a copy of the November 18, 2005 Order are also attached as required by Ninth Circuit Local Rule 3-4.

Respectfully Submitted,

PORTER, SCOTT, WEIBERG & DELEHANT A Professional Corporation

Ву

Terence J. Cassidy Michael W. Pott

Attorney for Defendants ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT, DR. STEVEN LADD, SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. M. MAGDALENA CARRILLO MEJIA, EL VERTA JOINT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. DIANNA MANGERICH, RIO LINDA

UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT and FRANK S. PORTER

Exhibit A

Omitted for Purposes of Appeal

A copy of the document that was attached to this Notice of Appeal as Exhibit A can be found at pages 198-227 of this Excerpts of Record

Exhibit B

Omitted for Purposes of Appeal

A copy of the document that was attached to this Notice of Appeal as

Exhibit B can be found at pages 241-244 of this Excerpts of Record

PETER D. KEISLER Assistant Attorney General McGREGOR W. SCOTT United States Attorney THEODORE C. HIRT Assistant Branch Director U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch P.O. Box 883 Washington, D.C. 20044 Tel.: (202) 514-4785 Fax: (202) 616-8470 Attorneys for the United States of America IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 10 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 THE REV. DR. MICHAEL A. NEWDOW NO. CIV. 2:05-cv-000017-LKK-DAD 12 et. al., 13 NOTICE OF APPEAL Plaintiffs, 14 ٧. 15 THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED Date: 16 STATES OF AMERICA, et al., (none) Time: (none) Judge: Hon, Lawrence K. Karlton 17 Defendants. No. 4 Courtroom: 18 19 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that, pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of 20 Appellate Procedure, the United States of America hereby appeals to the United States Court of 21 Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from the District Court's permanent injunction dated November 18, 22 2005 and the District Court's orders dated September 14, 2005. 23 The Representation Statement and Civil Appeals Docketing Statement are attached as 24 required by the Ninth Circuit Rules 3-2 and 3-4. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a copy of 25 both of the September 14, 2005 Orders and as Exhibit "B" a copy of the November 18, 2005 26 Order as required by Ninth Circuit Rule 3-4. 27 28

	Case 2:05-cv-00017-LixK-DAD	Document 119	Filed 01/15, 2006	Page 2 of 2			
l							
2		Respectfully subr	nitted,				
3		PETER D. KEISI Assistant Attorne					
4 5		McGREGOR W. SCOTT United States Attorney					
6		Office States Att	orney				
7	,	/s/Theodore C. F THEODORE C. I	lirt LIDT				
		(D.C. No. 24298 Assistant Directo	2)				
8 9		U.S. Department Civil Division, Fe		ch			
10		P.O. Box 883 Washington, D.C	. 20044				
11		Tel.: (202) 514 Fax: (202) 616	-4785				
12		Attorneys for the United States of A	A merica				
13	Dated: January 13, 2006	Office States of 7	America				
14	Dated. January 13, 2000						
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Exhibit A

Omitted for Purposes of Appeal

A copy of the document that was attached to this Notice of Appeal as

Exhibit A can be found at pages 198-227 of this Excerpts of Record

Exhibit B

Omitted for Purposes of Appeal

A copy of the document that was attached to this Notice of Appeal as Exhibit B can be found at pages 241-244 of this Excerpts of Record

APPEAL, CIVIL

U.S. District Court Eastern District of California - Live System (Sacramento) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:05-cv-00017-LKK-DAD

Newdow et al v. Congress of the United States of America et Date Filed: 01/03/2005

Assigned to: Senior Judge Lawrence K. Karlton

Referred to: Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd

Cause: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

Jury Demand: None

Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other

Jurisdiction: U.S. Government

Defendant

Plaintiff

Rev. Dr. Michael A Newdow represented by Michael Arthur Newdow

> Michael Newdow, Esq. P.O. Box 233345 Sacramento, CA 95823

(916) 427-6669

Email: NewdowLaw@cs.com

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Pat Doe represented by Michael Arthur Newdow

> (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Ž.

DoeChild represented by Michael Arthur Newdow

> (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Jan Poe represented by Michael Arthur Newdow

> (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

PoeChild represented by Michael Arthur Newdow

> (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Jan Roe represented by Michael Arthur Newdow

(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

RoeChild-1 represented by Michael Arthur Newdow

(See above for address) *LEAD ATTORNEY*

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Jan Doe represented by Michael Arthur Newdow

(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Pat Doe represented by Michael Arthur Newdow

(See above for address) *LEAD ATTORNEY*

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

DoeChild represented by Michael Arthur Newdow

(See above for address) *LEAD ATTORNEY*

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Jan Poe represented by Michael Arthur Newdow

(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

PoeChild represented by Michael Arthur Newdow

(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Jan Roe represented by Michael Arthur Newdow

(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

RoeChild-1 represented by Michael Arthur Newdow

(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

RoeChild-2

represented by Michael Arthur Newdow

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

William Mayo

TERMINATED: 01/13/2005

represented by William Mayo

P.O. Box 5227

Chico, CA 95927-5227

(530) 898-8468

Email: wmayo@mayolawclinic.com

PRO SE

V.

Defendant

Congress of the United States of

America

represented by Craig Manning Blackwell

U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Div.,

Federal Programs Branch

P.O. Box 883

Washington, DC 20044

(202) 616-0679

Fax: (202) 616-8470

Email: craig.blackwell@usdoj.gov

TERMINATED: 10/13/2005

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore Charles Hirt

Civil Division, U.S. Department Of

Justice

20 Massachusetts Ave. N.w.

Washington, DC 20530

202514-4785

Fax: 202616-8470

Email: theodore.hirt@usdoj.gov

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Elk Grove School District

represented by Terence John Cassidy

Porter, Scott, Weiberg & Delehant 350 University Avenue, Suite 200

Sacramento, CA 95825

(916) 929-1481 x316

Fax: (916) 927-3706

Email: tcassidy@pswdlaw.com

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael William Pott

Porter, Scott, Weiberg & Delehant

350 University Avenue

Suite 200

Sacramento, CA 95825 (916) 929-1481 x333

Fax: (916) 927-3706

Email: mpott@pswdlaw.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Lincoln Unified School District

TERMINATED: 04/11/2005

represented by Terence John Cassidy

(See above for address) *LEAD ATTORNEY*

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Sacramento City Unified School

District

represented by Terence John Cassidy

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael William Pott

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Elverta Joint Elementary School

District

TERMINATED: 10/28/2005

represented by Terence John Cassidy

(See above for address) *LEAD ATTORNEY*

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael William Pott

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Rio Linda Unified School District

represented by Terence John Cassidy

(See above for address) *LEAD ATTORNEY*

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael William Pott

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

United States of America

represented by Craig Manning Blackwell

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/13/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore Charles Hirt

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Dr. Steven Ladd

Superintendent, Elk Grove Unified School District

represented by Terence John Cassidy

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael William Pott

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

State of California

TERMINATED: 04/11/2005

represented by Jill Bowers

California Department of Justice 1300 I Street, Suite 1101 P.O. Box 944255 Sacracramento, CA 94244-2550 (916) 323-1948 Fax: (916) 324-5567 Email: jill.bowers@doj.ca.gov LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Janet Petsche

Associate Superintendent, Lincoln Unified School District TERMINATED: 04/11/2005

represented by Terence John Cassidy

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

M Magdalena Carrillo Mejia

Superintendent, Sacramento City Unified School District

represented by Terence John Cassidy

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael William Pott

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Dr. Dianna Mangerich

Superintendent, Elverta Joint Elementary School District

represented by Terence John Cassidy

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael William Pott

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Frank S Porter

Superintendent, Rio Linda Union School District

represented by Terence John Cassidy

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael William Pott

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Peter LeFevre

Law Revision Counsel

represented by Craig Manning Blackwell

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/13/2005

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore Charles Hirt

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Arnold Schwarzenegger

Governor of California

represented by Jill Bowers

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Richard J. Riordan

California Secretary for Education

represented by Jill Bowers

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.

Intervenor Defendant

John Carey, et al.

represented by Anthony R. Picarello

Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 1350 Connecticut Avenue NW

Suite 605

Washington, DC 20036 202-955-0098 Fax: 202-955-0090 Email: apicarello@becketfund.org LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Derek Lewis Gaubatz

Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
1350 Connecticut Avenue Northwest
Suite 605
Washington, DC 20036
202-955-0098
Email: dgaubatz@becketfund.org
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric C. Rassbach

Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 1350 Connecticut Avenue NW Suite 605 Washington, DC 20036 202-955-0098 Fax: 202-955-0090 Email: erassbach@becketfund.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jared N. Leland

Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 1350 Connecticut Avenue NW Suite 605 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 955-0098 Fax: 202-955-0090 Email: jleland@becketfund.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor

USA

represented by Theodore Charles Hirt

(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed	#	Docket Text
01/03/2005		COMPLAINT against all defendants, filed by Michael Newdow, Jan Doe, Pat Doe, DoeChild, Jan Poe, PoeChild, Jan Roe, RoeChild-1,

	RoeChild-2 against all defendants, filed by Pat Doe, DoeChild, Jan Poe, PoeChild, Jan Roe, RoeChild-1, Jan Doe, Pat Doe, DoeChild, Jan Poe, PoeChild, Jan Roe, RoeChild-1, RoeChild-2.(Newdow, Michael) (Entered: 01/03/2005)
	RECEIPT number 202 12779 for \$150.00 for Civil Case Filing from Michael Newdow. (Warren, P) (Entered: 01/04/2005)
3	CIVIL NEW CASE DOCUMENTS ISSUED; Initial Scheduling Conference set for 3/14/2005 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 4 (LKK) before Senior Judge Lawrence K. Karlton. (Attachments: # 1 Consent Forms # 2 VDRP Forms) (Warren, P) (Entered: 01/04/2005)
4	SUMMONS ISSUED as to *Congress of the United States of America, United States of America* with answer to complaint due within *60* days. (Holland, K) (Entered: 01/05/2005)
<u>5</u>	SUMMONS ISSUED as to *Elk Grove School District, Steven Ladd, State Of California, Lincoln Unified School District, Janet Petsche, M Magdalena Carrillo Mejia, Dianna Mangerich, Frank S Porter, Sacramento City Unified School District, Elverta Joint Elementary School District, Rio Linda Unified School District* with answer to complaint due within *20* days. (Holland, K) (Entered: 01/05/2005)
6	CERTIFICATE of SERVICE by Pat Doe, DoeChild, Jan Poe, PoeChild, Jan Roe, RoeChild-1, Jan Doe, Michael A Newdow, RoeChild-2 (Newdow, Michael) (Entered: 01/06/2005)
7	NOTICE of RELATED CASE 2:04-cv-1920, 2:05-cv-00017 by William Mayo (Mayo, William) (Entered: 01/07/2005)
<u>8</u>	Non-Related Case ORDER. Court finds that it is inappropriate to relate or reassign this matter with CIV. S-04-1920 FCD PAN and therefore declines to do so, signed by Judge Frank C. Damrell Jr. on 1/11/2005. (Waggoner, D) (Entered: 01/13/2005)
9	MOTION for PROTECTIVE ORDER by Pat Doe, DoeChild, Jan Poe, PoeChild, Jan Roe, RoeChild-1, Jan Doe, Michael A Newdow, RoeChild-2. (Newdow, Michael) (Entered: 01/30/2005)
<u>10</u>	MOTION for PROTECTIVE ORDER by DoeChild, Jan Poe, PoeChild, Jan Roe, RoeChild-1, Jan Doe, Pat Doe, Michael A Newdow, RoeChild-2. Motion Hearing set for 3/7/2005 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 4 (LKK) before Senior Judge Lawrence K. Karlton. (Newdow, Michael) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
<u>11</u>	CERTIFICATE of SERVICE by DoeChild, Jan Poe, PoeChild, Jan Roe, RoeChild-1, Jan Doe, Pat Doe, Michael A Newdow, RoeChild-2 re 10 MOTION for PROTECTIVE ORDER (Notice of Motion) (Newdow, Michael) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
<u>12</u>	NOTICE of APPEARANCE by Jill Bowers on behalf of State Of California (Bowers, Jill) (Entered: 02/15/2005)
	4 5 7 8 9

02/18/2005	<u>13</u>	RESPONSE to MOTION re 9 MOTION for PROTECTIVE ORDER, 10 MOTION for PROTECTIVE ORDER filed by the federal defendants. (Blackwell, Craig) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
02/18/2005	14	CERTIFICATE of SERVICE by Congress of the United States of America, United States of America re 13 Response to Motion for protective order (Blackwell, Craig) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
02/18/2005	<u>15</u>	MEMORANDUM/RESPONSE in OPPOSITION to Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Orders. (Bowers, Jill) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
02/18/2005	<u>16</u>	MEMORANDUM/RESPONSE in OPPOSITION to Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order. (Cassidy, Terence) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
02/22/2005	17	REPLY to RESPONSE to MOTION re 9 MOTION for PROTECTIVE ORDER. (Newdow, Michael) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
02/28/2005	<u>18</u>	ORDER RESETTING MOTION HEARING as to 910 MOTION for PROTECTIVE ORDER: Motion Hearing set for 3/28/2005 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 4 (LKK) before Senior Judge Lawrence K. Karlton. Signed by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 2/28/05. (Hinkle, T) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
03/04/2005	<u>19</u>	STATUS REPORT by Congress of the United States of America, United States of America. (Blackwell, Craig) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
03/04/2005	20	STATUS REPORT by State Of California. (Bowers, Jill) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
03/04/2005	21	STATUS REPORT by Pat Doe, DoeChild, Jan Poe, PoeChild, Jan Roe, RoeChild-1, Jan Doe, Michael A Newdow, RoeChild-2. (Newdow, Michael) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
03/04/2005	<u>22</u>	STATUS REPORT by Elk Grove School District, Steven Ladd, Lincoln Unified School District, Janet Petsche, M Magdalena Carrillo Mejia, Dianna Mangerich, Frank S Porter, Sacramento City Unified School District, Elverta Joint Elementary School District, Rio Linda Unified School District. (Cassidy, Terence) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
03/05/2005	23	STATUS REPORT by Pat Doe, DoeChild, Jan Poe, PoeChild, Jan Roe, RoeChild-1, Jan Doe, Michael A Newdow, RoeChild-2. (Newdow, Michael) (Entered: 03/05/2005)
03/07/2005	<u>24</u>	STIPULATION to Continue Status Conference; Proposed Order by State Of California. (Bowers, Jill) (Entered: 03/07/2005)
03/08/2005	25	ORDER signed by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 3/7/05: The parties' Stipulation 24 is DENIED. The Status Conference is CONFIRMED for 3/14/05. (Hinkle, T) (Entered: 03/08/2005)
03/14/2005	<u>26</u>	MINUTES for proceedings held before Judge Lawrence K. Karlton: SCHEDULING CONFERENCE held on 3/14/2005. Plaintiffs Counsel Michael Newdow present. Defendants Counsel Terry Cassidy (EGUSD), Craig Blackwell (Fed. Dfts) and Leslie Lopez (State Dfts) present. Court

		order to issue. (Hinkle, T) (Entered: 03/15/2005)
03/16/2005	27	SCHEDULING ORDER: Plaintiff is granted thirty days to amend. All motions to dismiss shall be filed by 5/16/05; oppositions by 6/20/05; replies by 7/8/05. The motions shall be noticed for hearing on the court's 7/18/05 law and motion calendar at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom No. 4.Signed by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 3/15/05. (Hinkle, T) (Entered: 03/16/2005)
03/25/2005	<u>28</u>	LETTER from counsel for the school district defendants stating that all parties, with the exception of the state defendants, have reached agreement on a stipulation to resolve plaintiffs' motion for protective order. (Hinkle, T) (Entered: 03/25/2005)
03/25/2005	<u>29</u>	LETTER from counsel for the state defendants joining in the parties' agreement to stipulate to a protective order and requesting that the hearing on plaintiffs' motion, currently set for March 28, 2005, be dropped from calendar. (Hinkle, T) (Entered: 03/25/2005)
03/25/2005	30	MINUTE ORDER: Pursuant to the parties' representations that they have agreed in principle to stipulate to a protective order, the hearing on plaintiffs' motion, currently set for March 28, 2005 is DROPPED from calendar. The parties will file their proposed stipulated protective order by 3/28/05. MOTION for PROTECTIVE ORDER 9 & 10 terminated. Ordered by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 3/25/05. (No document attached).(Hinkle, T) (Entered: 03/25/2005)
03/28/2005	31	STIPULATION and PROPOSED ORDER Stipulated Protective Order by Elk Grove School District, Steven Ladd, Lincoln Unified School District, Janet Petsche, M Magdalena Carrillo Mejia, Dianna Mangerich, Frank S Porter, Sacramento City Unified School District, Elverta Joint Elementary School District, Rio Linda Unified School District. (Cassidy, Terence) (Entered: 03/28/2005)
03/29/2005	32	STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER signed by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 3/29/05. (Hinkle, T) (Entered: 03/29/2005)
04/11/2005	<u>33</u>	AMENDED COMPLAINT against all defendants, filed by Michael A Newdow.(Newdow, Michael) (Entered: 04/11/2005)
04/12/2005	<u>34</u>	SUMMONS ISSUED as to *Congress of the United States of America, United States of America* with answer to complaint due within *60* days. Attorney *Michael Newdow* *P.O. Box 233345* *Sacramento, CA 95823*. (Krueger, M) (Entered: 04/12/2005)
04/12/2005	<u>35</u>	SUMMONS ISSUED as to *Peter LeFevre, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Richard J. Riordan, Elk Grove School District, Steven Ladd, M Magdalena Carrillo Mejia, Dianna Mangerich, Frank S Porter, Sacramento City Unified School District, Elverta Joint Elementary School District, Rio Linda Unified School District* with answer to complaint due within *20* days. Attorney *Michael Newdow* *P.O. Box 233345* *Sacramento, CA 95823*. (Krueger, M) (Entered: 04/12/2005)

04/13/2005	<u>36</u>	Amended summons issued as to *Peter LeFevre, Congress of the United States of America, United States of America* with answer to complaint due within *60* days. Attorney *Michael Newdow* *PO Box 233345* *Sacramento, CA 95823*. (Plummer, M) (Entered: 04/13/2005)
04/13/2005	37	Amended summons issued as to *Arnold Schwarzenegger, Richard J. Riordan, Elk Grove School District, Steven Ladd, M Magdalena Carrillo Mejia, Dianna Mangerich, Frank S Porter, Sacramento City Unified School District, Elverta Joint Elementary School District, Rio Linda Unified School District* with answer to complaint due within *20* days. Attorney *Michael Newdow* *PO Box 233345* *Sacramento, CA 95823*. (Plummer, M) (Entered: 04/13/2005)
04/22/2005	38	CERTIFICATE of SERVICE by Michael A Newdow First Amended Complaint and Summons to Defendants Schwarzenegger and Riordan and to U.S. Attorney (Newdow, Michael) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
05/09/2005	<u>39</u>	MOTION to INTERVENE and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene by John Carey, et al Motion Hearing set for 5/23/2005 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 4 (LKK) before Senior Judge Lawrence K. Karlton. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum In Support of Motion to Intervene)(Gaubatz, Derek) Modified on 5/10/2005 (Marciel, M). (Entered: 05/09/2005)
05/09/2005	40	ANSWER to AMENDED COMPLAINT by John Carey, et al(Gaubatz, Derek) (Entered: 05/09/2005)
05/11/2005	41	MINUTE ORDER: re 39 Motion to Intervene. The Motion is defectively noticed, and will not be set for hearing on the Court's May 23, 2005 Law & Motion Calendar. Plaintiff is advised to file and serve a new notice of motion in accordance with Local Rule 78-230(b). (Rivas, A) (Entered: 05/11/2005)
05/16/2005	<u>42</u>	First Amended MOTION to AMEND/CORRECT Motion to Intervene and hearing date 39 MOTION to INTERVENE and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene by John Carey, et al Motion Hearing set for 7/18/2005 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 4 (LKK) before Senior Judge Lawrence K. Karlton. (Gaubatz, Derek) (Entered: 05/16/2005)
05/16/2005	43	MOTION to DISMISS by Peter LeFevre, Congress of the United States of America, United States of America. Motion Hearing set for 7/18/2005 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 4 (LKK) before Senior Judge Lawrence K. Karlton. (Blackwell, Craig) (Entered: 05/16/2005)
05/16/2005	<u>44</u>	MEMORANDUM/RESPONSE in SUPPORT re 43 MOTION to DISMISS on behalf of the Congress, the United States, and Peter LeFevre. (Blackwell, Craig) (Entered: 05/16/2005)
05/16/2005	<u>45</u>	MOTION to INTERVENE by United States of America. Motion Hearing set for 7/18/2005 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 4 (LKK) before Senior Judge Lawrence K. Karlton. (Blackwell, Craig) (Entered: 05/16/2005)
05/16/2005	<u>46</u>	MEMORANDUM/RESPONSE in SUPPORT re 45 MOTION to

		INTERVENE of the United States. (Blackwell, Craig) (Entered: 05/16/2005)
05/16/2005	47	MOTION to DISMISS by Arnold Schwarzenegger, Richard J. Riordan. Motion Hearing set for 7/18/2005 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 4 (LKK) before Senior Judge Lawrence K. Karlton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibits A - C# 2 Appendix Part I of II# 3 Appendix Part II of II) (Bowers, Jill) (Entered: 05/16/2005)
05/16/2005	<u>48</u>	MOTION to DISMISS by Elk Grove School District, Steven Ladd, M Magdalena Carrillo Mejia, Dianna Mangerich, Frank S Porter, Sacramento City Unified School District, Elverta Joint Elementary School District, Rio Linda Unified School District. Motion Hearing set for 7/18/2005 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 4 (LKK) before Senior Judge Lawrence K. Karlton. (Pott, Michael) (Entered: 05/16/2005)
05/16/2005	<u>49</u>	MEMORANDUM/RESPONSE in SUPPORT of Motion to Dismiss. (Pott, Michael) (Entered: 05/16/2005)
05/16/2005	<u>50</u>	DECLARATION of Terence J. Cassidy in SUPPORT OF <i>Motion to Dismiss</i> . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Pott, Michael) (Entered: 05/16/2005)
05/16/2005	<u>51</u>	REQUEST for JUDICIAL NOTICE by Elk Grove School District, Steven Ladd, M Magdalena Carrillo Mejia, Dianna Mangerich, Frank S Porter, Sacramento City Unified School District, Elverta Joint Elementary School District, Rio Linda Unified School District. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Volume I# 2 Exhibit A Volume II# 3 Exhibit B)(Pott, Michael) (Entered: 05/16/2005)
05/16/2005	<u>52</u>	MOTION to DISMISS <i>First Amended Complaint</i> by John Carey, et al Motion Hearing set for 7/18/2005 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 4 (LKK) before Senior Judge Lawrence K. Karlton. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss)(Gaubatz, Derek) (Entered: 05/16/2005)
05/17/2005	<u>53</u>	PROPOSED ORDER re Eric C. Rassbach to appear pro hac vice for John Carey, et al (Duong, D) (Entered: 05/18/2005)
05/17/2005	<u>54</u>	PROPOSED ORDER re Jared N Leland to appear pro hac vice for John Carey et al. (Duong, D) (Entered: 05/18/2005)
05/17/2005	<u>55</u>	PROPOSED ORDER re Anthony R. Picarello Jr. to appear pro hac vice for John Carey, et al. (Duong, D) (Entered: 05/18/2005)
05/17/2005		RECEIPT number 6250 for \$180 for Pro Hac Vice Application from Eric C. Rassbach (Duong, D) (Entered: 05/18/2005)
05/17/2005		RECEIPT number 6251 for \$180 for Pro Hac Vice Application from Anthony R. Picarello. (Duong, D) (Entered: 05/18/2005)
05/18/2005		RECEIPT number 6252 for \$180 for Pro Hac Vice Application from Jared N. Leland. (Duong, D) (Entered: 05/18/2005)

05/19/2005	<u>56</u>	PROPOSED ORDER Propsed Order Granting School District Defendants' Motion to Dismiss re 48 MOTION to DISMISS, 49 Memorandum/Response in Support of Motion, 50, 51 Request for Judicial Notice, by Elk Grove School District, Steven Ladd, M Magdalena Carrillo Mejia, Dianna Mangerich, Frank S Porter, Sacramento City Unified School District, Elverta Joint Elementary School District, Rio Linda Unified School District. (Cassidy, Terence) (Entered: 05/19/2005)
06/03/2005	<u>57</u>	STATEMENT of NON-OPPOSITION to MOTION re <u>39</u> MOTION to INTERVENE and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene by Defendant-Intervenors John Carey. (Bowers, Jill) (Entered: 06/03/2005)
06/07/2005	<u>58</u>	NOTICE of withdrawal of intervenors Dave Magnino, Lynette Magnino, and Brenden Magnino re 39 MOTION to INTERVENE. (Gaubatz, Derek) Modified on 6/8/2005 (Dotson, B). (Entered: 06/07/2005)
06/13/2005	<u>59</u>	ORDER Denying re 535455 Proposed Orders granting such applications filed by Jared N Leland, Anthony R Picarello Jr., and Eric C. Rassbach signed by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 6/10/05. (cc J Leland, A Picarello and E Rassbach) (Duong, D) (Entered: 06/13/2005)
06/15/2005	<u>60</u>	PRO HAC VICE APPLICATION by John Carey, et al. for attorney Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. to appear Pro Hac Vice for Intervenor Defendant John Carey, et al (Attachments: # 1 Signature Page for Application# 2 Proposed Order # 3 Declaration regarding fees# 4 Signature Page for Declaration)(Picarello, Anthony) (Entered: 06/15/2005)
06/15/2005	<u>61</u>	PRO HAC VICE APPLICATION by John Carey, et al. for attorney Eric C. Rassbach to appear Pro Hac Vice for Intervenor Defendant John Carey, et al (Attachments: # 1 Signature Page for Application# 2 Proposed Order # 3 Declaration regarding fees# 4 Signature Page for Declaration)(Rassbach, Eric) (Entered: 06/15/2005)
06/15/2005	<u>62</u>	PRO HAC VICE APPLICATION by John Carey, et al. for attorney Jared N. Leland to appear Pro Hac Vice for Intervenor Defendant John Carey, et al (Attachments: # 1 Signature Page for Application# 2 Proposed Order # 3 Declaration regarding fees# 4 Signature Page for Declaration) (Leland, Jared) (Entered: 06/15/2005)
06/20/2005	<u>63</u>	RESPONSE to MOTION re 43 MOTION to DISMISS. (Newdow, Michael) (Entered: 06/20/2005)
06/30/2005	<u>64</u>	RESPONSE to 45 MOTION to INTERVENE. (Newdow, Michael) Modified on 7/1/2005 (Dotson, B). (Entered: 06/30/2005)
07/08/2005	<u>65</u>	REPLY to RESPONSE to MOTION re <u>47</u> MOTION to DISMISS; Appendix. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Part 1 of 5# 2 Appendix Part 2 of 5# 3 Appendix Part 3 of 5# 4 Appendix Part 4 of 5# 5 Appendix Part 5 of 5)(Bowers, Jill) (Entered: 07/08/2005)
07/08/2005	<u>66</u>	REPLY to RESPONSE to MOTION re <u>43</u> MOTION to DISMISS.

		(Blackwell, Craig) (Entered: 07/08/2005)
07/08/2005	<u>67</u>	REPLY to RESPONSE to MOTION re <u>45</u> MOTION to INTERVENE. (Blackwell, Craig) (Entered: 07/08/2005)
07/08/2005	<u>68</u>	REPLY to RESPONSE to MOTION to Intervene of Defendant-Intervenors John Carey, et al (Gaubatz, Derek) (Entered: 07/08/2005)
07/08/2005	<u>69</u>	REPLY to RESPONSE to MOTION to Dismiss by Schoold District dfts. (Pott, Michael) Modified on 7/11/2005 (Duong, D). (Entered: 07/08/2005)
07/08/2005	<u>70</u>	REQUEST for JUDICIAL NOTICE by Elk Grove School District, Steven Ladd, M Magdalena Carrillo Mejia, Dianna Mangerich, Frank S Porter, Sacramento City Unified School District, Elverta Joint Elementary School District, Rio Linda Unified School District <i>in Support of Reply</i> . (Pott, Michael) (Entered: 07/08/2005)
07/12/2005	<u>71</u>	REPLY to RESPONSE to MOTION re <u>52</u> MOTION to DISMISS <i>First Amended Complaint</i> . (Gaubatz, Derek) (Entered: 07/12/2005)
07/13/2005	<u>72</u>	PRO HAC VICE ORDER re 60 signed by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 7/12/05 allowed Attorney Anthony R. Picarello to appear for dft-intervenors John Carey, et al. (Duong, D) (Entered: 07/13/2005)
07/13/2005	<u>73</u>	PRO HAC VICE ORDER re 62 signed by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 7/12/05 allowed Attorney Jared N. Leland to appear for dft-intervenors John Carey, et al. (Duong, D) (Entered: 07/13/2005)
07/13/2005	<u>74</u>	PRO HAC VICE ORDER re <u>61</u> signed by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 7/12/05 allowed Attorney Eric C. Rassbach to appear for dft-intervenors John Carey, et al. (Duong, D) (Entered: 07/13/2005)
07/14/2005	<u>75</u>	DISREGARD [REQUEST for JUDICIAL NOTICE by Pat Doe, DoeChild, RoeChild-1, Jan Doe, Jan Roe, Michael A Newdow, RoeChild-2. (Newdow, Michael)] Modified on 7/14/2005 (Duong, D). (Entered: 07/14/2005)
07/14/2005	<u>76</u>	REQUEST for JUDICIAL NOTICE by Pat Doe, DoeChild, Jan Roe, RoeChild-1, Jan Doe, Michael A Newdow, RoeChild-2. (Newdow, Michael) (Entered: 07/14/2005)
07/15/2005	<u>77</u>	LETTER from counsel for proposed intervenors requesting leave to late-file their reply brief. (Hinkle, T) (Entered: 07/15/2005)
07/15/2005	78	MINUTE ORDER: Defendant-Intervenors' request 77 to late-file their reply brief is GRANTED. Their brief is deemed timely filed. Ordered by Judge Karlton on 7/15/05. (No document attached).(Hinkle, T) (Entered: 07/15/2005)
07/18/2005	79	MINUTES for proceedings held before Judge Lawrence K. Karlton: MOTION HEARING held on 7/18/2005 re 3945 MOTIONS TO INTERVENE and 42474852 MOTIONS to DISMISS by defendants and Intervenors. 39 MOTION to INTERVENE filed by John Carey, et al.,

		and 45 MOTION to INTERVENE filed by United States of America are GRANTED. After Oral Argument the motions stand SUBMITTED. The Court will issue an order. Motions terminated: 39 MOTION to INTERVENE filed by John Carey, et al. 45 MOTION to INTERVENE filed by United States of America. Plaintiffs Counsel Michael Newdow present. Defendants Counsel Jill Bowers, Terence Cassidy, Craig Blackwell, Eric Rassback, Jared Leland present. Court Reporter: C. Bodene. (Rivas, A) (Entered: 07/18/2005)
08/11/2005	<u>80</u>	NOTICE of New Case Law in support of dfts' Motion to Dismiss by Elk Grove School District, Steven Ladd, M Magdalena Carrillo Mejia, Dianna Mangerich, Frank S Porter, Sacramento City Unified School District, Elverta Joint Elementary School District, Rio Linda Unified School District (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Cassidy, Terence) Modified on 8/12/2005 (Duong, D). (Entered: 08/11/2005)
09/14/2005	81	MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 43, 47, 48, 52 defendants' Motions to Dismiss: Defendants' motions to dismiss the claim as to the recitation of the Pledge in a classroom is DENIED; and as to all other causes of action, the motion is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 9/14/05. [TO BE PUBLISHED] (Hinkle, T) Modified on 9/14/2005 (Duong, D). (Entered: 09/14/2005)
09/14/2005	<u>82</u>	ORDER signed by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 9/14/05 amending <u>81</u> Order at page 30, line 21, in footnote 22, to add the word "years" following the phrase "one hundred." (Hinkle, T) (Entered: 09/14/2005)
09/19/2005	<u>83</u>	NOTICE and PETITION for Certification of Order for Interlocutory Appeal by dft-intervenors (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Petition for Certification of Order for Interlocutory Appeal# 2 Proposed Order). Hearing set for 10/24/05 10:00am.(Gaubatz, Derek) Modified on 9/20/2005 (Duong, D). (Entered: 09/19/2005)
09/19/2005	<u>84</u>	NOTICE of APPEARANCE by Theodore Charles Hirt on behalf of United States of America (Hirt, Theodore) (Entered: 09/19/2005)
09/23/2005	85	MINUTE ORDER: A Status Conference is now set for 10/31/2005 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 4 (LKK) before Senior Judge Lawrence K. Karlton. The parties are directed to FILE status reports not later than ten (10) days preceding the conference. (No document attached)(Rivas, A) (Entered: 09/23/2005)
09/23/2005	86	MINUTE ORDER: The Minute Order [85] dated 09/23/2005 is amended as follows: The status conference currently set for 10/31/2005 is hereby ADVANCED to 10/05/2005 at 10:00 AM. The parties need not file status reports. (Rivas, A) (Entered: 09/23/2005)
09/26/2005	<u>87</u>	Defendants' ANSWER to AMENDED COMPLAINT and Demand for Jury Trial by Elk Grove School District, Elverta Joint Elementary School District, Rio Linda Unified School District. (Cassidy, Terence) (Entered: 09/26/2005)

09/29/2005	<u>88</u>	STATUS REPORT by Elk Grove School District, Elverta Joint Elementary School District, Rio Linda Unified School District. (Cassidy, Terence) (Entered: 09/29/2005)
09/30/2005	<u>89</u>	APPLICATION/REQUEST for Telephonic Appearance by Counsel by United States of America. (Hirt, Theodore) (Entered: 09/30/2005)
10/05/2005	90	MINUTES for proceedings held before Judge Lawrence K. Karlton: STATUS CONFERENCE held on 10/5/2005. Plaintiffs are instructed to file Affidavits re the issue of standing within three (3) weeks (by 10/26/2005). Defendants, if they find appropriate, may file a Motion for Summary Judgment by 10/26/2005. Opposition briefs and Responsive Affidavits due by 11/16/2005. Matter will stand submitted at that time. The Court will set the matter for hearing if necessary. Plaintiffs Counsel Michael Newdow present. Defendants Counsel Terence Cassidy, Eric Rassbach, Theo Hirt (via telephone), Joseph Maloney, Michael Pott present. Court Reporter: C. Bodene. (Rivas, A) (Entered: 10/05/2005)
10/12/2005	<u>91</u>	ORDER setting briefing schedule signed by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 10/11/05: (1) plaintiffs are directed to file affidavits in support of injunction and the merits by 10/26/05; (2) by that date, defendants are directed to file an msj as to Elverta School Dist.; (3) defendants shall file responsive affidavits by 11/16/05; (4) by that date plaintiffs shall also file an opposition to dfts.' msj; (5) the hearing on the motion to certify for interlocutory appeal is vacated. (Hinkle, T) (Entered: 10/12/2005)
10/25/2005	92	STIPULATION of DISMISSAL AND PROPOSED ORDER by Elk Grove School District, Elverta Joint Elementary School District, Rio Linda Unified School District. (Pott, Michael) (Entered: 10/25/2005)
10/26/2005	<u>93</u>	MOTION for PERMANENT INJUNCTION by Michael A Newdow. (Newdow, Michael) (Entered: 10/26/2005)
10/26/2005	<u>94</u>	DECLARATION of Doe, Doechild & Roe in Support of re 93 MOTION for PERMANENT INJUNCTION. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Doe, DoeChild and Roe Affidavits# 2 Proposed Order Permanent Injunction plus Stay)(Newdow, Michael) (Entered: 10/26/2005)
10/28/2005	<u>95</u>	STIPULATION and ORDER 92 signed by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 10/26/05. Plaintiffs are DISMISSING Complaint in its entirety, and without prejudice, as to defendant Elverta Joint Elementary School District. All parties to bear their own fees and costs. (Marciel, M) (Entered: 10/28/2005)
11/16/2005	<u>96</u>	MEMORANDUM/RESPONSE in OPPOSITION re 93 MOTION for PERMANENT INJUNCTION. (Gaubatz, Derek) (Entered: 11/16/2005)
11/16/2005	<u>97</u>	OBJECTIONS by Intervenor Defendant John Carey, et al. to <u>94</u> Declarations in Support of Motion for Permanent Injunction. (Gaubatz, Derek) (Entered: 11/16/2005)
11/16/2005	98	MEMORANDUM/RESPONSE in OPPOSITION from School District Dfts to plts' motion for a permanent injunction/counter-motion to

		dismiss/summary adjudication re the Doe plts/dfts' Request for stay. (Cassidy, Terence) Modified on 11/17/2005 (Duong, D). (Entered: 11/16/2005)
11/16/2005	<u>99</u>	MEMORANDUM/RESPONSE in OPPOSITION Objections to Evidence Proffered by Plaintiffs in Support of Their Motion for Permanent Injunction. (Cassidy, Terence) (Entered: 11/16/2005)
11/16/2005	<u>100</u>	NOTICE by Elk Grove School District, Rio Linda Unified School District Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Adjudication as to the Doe Plaintiffs and Elk Grove Unified School Distirct (Cassidy, Terence) (Entered: 11/16/2005)
11/16/2005	101	DECLARATION of Dr. Steven Ladd in in Support of School District Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Permanent Injunction/Defendants' Request for Stay. (Cassidy, Terence) (Entered: 11/16/2005)
11/16/2005	<u>102</u>	PROPOSED ORDER by Elk Grove School District, Rio Linda Unified School District. (Cassidy, Terence) (Entered: 11/16/2005)
11/16/2005	<u>103</u>	PROPOSED ORDER by Elverta Joint Elementary School District, Rio Linda Unified School District. (Cassidy, Terence) (Entered: 11/16/2005)
11/16/2005	104	MEMORANDUM/RESPONSE in OPPOSITION to Motion for Permanent Injunction. (Hirt, Theodore) (Entered: 11/16/2005)
11/16/2005	<u>105</u>	SUPPLEMENT by Elk Grove School District, Rio Linda Unified School District re 98 Memorandum/Response in Opposition to Motion, <i>Table of Contents and Table of Authorities</i> . (Cassidy, Terence) (Entered: 11/16/2005)
11/18/2005	<u>106</u>	ORDER signed by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 11/18/05 ORDERING Doe pltf DISMISSED; EGUSD is DISMISSED as a dft in this case; dft Rio Linda School District is PROHIBITED from applying its Board Policy AR6115 to the extent the policy requires the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance so as to fulfill the patriotic exercise requirement of CA Education Code Section 52720; the permanent injunction issued by this Court as to Rio Linda School District is STAYED pending resolution of any and all appeals regarding this matter brought before the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the US Supreme Court. (Carlos, K) (Entered: 11/18/2005)(Carlos, K) (Entered: 11/18/2005)
11/21/2005	<u>107</u>	NOTICE of APPEAL by John Carey, et al. as to <u>81</u> Order on Motion to Dismiss,,,,,,, <u>106</u> Order,, (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Statement Civil Appeals Docketing Statement# <u>2</u> Statement Representation Statement)(Gaubatz, Derek) (Entered: 11/21/2005)
11/21/2005	108	Attachment - Orders Appealed by John Carey, et al. re <u>107</u> Notice of Appeal. (Gaubatz, Derek) Modified on 11/30/2005 (Mena-Sanchez, L). (Entered: 11/21/2005)
11/21/2005	110	USCA APPEAL FEES received of *\$ 255* receipt number 202 14586 re 107 Notice of Appeal filed by John Carey, et al., (Mena-Sanchez, L)

		(Entered: 11/21/2005)	
11/23/2005	111	APPEAL PROCESSED to Ninth Circuit re 107 Notice of Appeal filed by John Carey, et al.,. Filed dates for Notice of Appeal *11/21/2005*, Complaint *1/3/2005* and Appealed Order *9/14/2005*. Court Reporter *C. Bodene*. *Fee Status: Paid on 11/21/2005 in the amount of \$255.00* ** (Attachments: # 1 Appeal Notice) (Duong, D) (Entered: 11/23/2005)	
12/01/2005	112	Transcript Designation and Ordering Form (Gaubatz, Derek) Modified or 12/2/2005 (Duong, D). (Entered: 12/01/2005)	
12/02/2005	113	CERTIFICATE of RECORD transmitted to Ninth Circuit re 107 Notice of Appeal filed by John Carey, et al., for USCA Case Number ** (Duong, D) (Entered: 12/02/2005)	
12/07/2005	114	USCA CASE NUMBER 05-17257 for 107 Notice of Appeal filed by John Carey et al. (Duong, D) (Entered: 12/08/2005)	
12/09/2005	<u>115</u>	NOTICE of APPEAL by Rio Linda Unified School District (Attachments: # 1 Representation Statement# 2 Civil Appeals Docketing Stmt)(Cassidy, Terence) (Entered: 12/09/2005)	
12/09/2005	116	APPEAL PROCESSED to Ninth Circuit re 115 Notice of Appeal filed by Rio Linda Unified School District,. Filed dates for Notice of Appeal *12/9/2005*, Complaint *1/3/2005* and Appealed Order / Judgment *11/18/2005*. Court Reporter: *C. Bodene*. *Fee Status: Not Paid - Billed* *Rio Linda Union School District* (Attachments: # 1 Appeal Notice # 2 Bill) (Duong, D) FEE PAID on 12/12/05 Modified on 12/13/2005 (Girgis, C). (Entered: 12/09/2005)	
12/12/2005		RECEIPT number 201 11288 for \$255.00 for Appeal Fee from Dft Rio Linda Union School District. (Kastilahn, A) (Entered: 12/12/2005)	
12/13/2005	117	NOTICE sent to USCA re: Appeal 115 paid. (Kastilahn, A) (Entered: 12/13/2005)	
12/16/2005	118	USCA CASE NUMBER 05-17344 for 115 Notice of Appeal filed by Rio Linda Unified School District. (TEXT ONLY ENTRY) (Matson, R) (Entered: 12/19/2005)	
01/13/2006	<u>119</u>	NOTICE of APPEAL by USA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits A-B# 2 Representation Statement # 3 Appeal Docketing Statement # 4Attachment to Docketing Statement)(Hirt, Theodore) Modified on 1/17/2006 (Duong, D). (Entered: 01/13/2006)	
01/17/2006	120	APPEAL PROCESSED to Ninth Circuit Filed dates for Notice of Appeal *1/13/2006*, Complaint *1/3/2005* and Appealed Order / Judgment *11/8/2005*. Court Reporter: *C. Bodene*. *Fee Status: Govt/USA Appeal* ** (Attachments: # 1 Appeal Notice) (Duong, D) (Entered: 01/17/2006)	
01/23/2006	121	USCA CASE NUMBER 06-15093 for 119 Notice of Appeal filed by USA. (Duong, D) (Entered: 01/24/2006)	

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